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How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option:
Lessons for the President (and others) from the 2011 Debt Ceiling Standoff
Abstract
The current successor to a federal statute first enacted in 1917, and widely
known as the “debt ceiling,” limits the face value of money that the United States
may borrow. Congress has repeatedly raised the debt ceiling to authorize
borrowing to fill the gap between revenue and spending, but in the summer of
2011, a political standoff nearly left the government unable to borrow funds to
meet obligations that Congress had affirmed earlier that very year. Some
commentators urged President Obama to ignore the debt ceiling and issue new
bonds, in order to comply with Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
forbids “question[ing]” “[t]he validity of the public debt.” Others responded that
such borrowing would violate the separation of powers and therefore that the
President instead ought to refuse to spend funds that Congress had appropriated.
In the end, eleventh-hour legislation averted the crisis, at least for the moment, but
absent a substantial political realignment, there is reason to believe that a similar
standoff could occur again.
This Article analyzes the choice the President nearly faced in summer
2011, and which he or a successor may face again, as a “trilemma” in which he
had three unconstitutional options: Ignore the debt ceiling and unilaterally issue
new bonds, thus usurping congressional power to borrow money; unilaterally
raise taxes, thus usurping congressional power to tax; or unilaterally cut spending,
thus usurping congressional power to make spending decisions and arguably
violating Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment as well. We argue that faced
with this choice among unconstitutional options, the President should choose the
“least unconstitutional” course—here, ignoring the debt ceiling. We argue
further, though more tentatively, that if the bond markets would render such debt
inadequate to close the gap, the President should unilaterally raise taxes rather
than unilaterally cut spending. We then use the debt ceiling impasse to develop
general criteria for political actors to choose among unconstitutional options.
Although we offer no algorithm, we emphasize three guiding principles: 1)
Minimize the unconstitutional assumption of power; 2) minimize subconstitutional harm; and 3) preserve, to the extent possible, the ability of other
actors to undo or remedy constitutional violations.
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I.

Introduction

In the spring of 2011, federal officials observed that at some point later in
the year, the federal government would be unable to meet all of its obligations
unless the federal debt ceiling were raised. That was not an economic
problem. Interest rates on United States Treasury Bills were close to zero percent,
and the government could readily issue new debt to cover its expenses, if only
Congress would go through the formal process of raising the debt ceiling to
conform with the budget that it itself had then only recently approved.1 There
was a political problem, however. Expressing concern about long-term fiscal
deficits, Republicans in Congress—especially those allied with the Tea Party
movement—insisted on a dollar of current spending cuts for every dollar increase
in the debt ceiling.2 Even as Keynesian economists warned of the dangers of
premature austerity, Democrats, including President Barack Obama, accepted the
Republican view that deficit reduction was imperative, but they insisted that
increased tax revenues had to be part of the formula for achieving that goal.3 A
standoff ensued.
As the day of reckoning approached with no deal in place, some observers
advanced a creative solution. Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, they
noted, forbids the questioning of “[t]he validity of the public debt of the United
States,”4 and therefore, they argued, the debt ceiling is unconstitutional insofar as
it forbids the federal government from honoring its existing financial
commitments.5 Accordingly, these observers contended that in the event that
Congress and the President failed to reach an agreement, the President would be
authorized, or perhaps even constitutionally obligated, to simply ignore the debt
ceiling.6 This proposed gambit was quickly dubbed the “nuclear option,”7 and it
garnered support from some prominent politicians, including former President
Bill Clinton.8

1

See Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No.
112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011).
2

See Alan Silverleib and Tom Cohen, Latest Deficit Talks End With a Tense Exchange, CNN (July
13,
2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-13/politics/debt.talks_1_debt-ceiling-short-termextension-debt-ceiling-hike
3

Id.

4

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.

5

See Elspeth Reeve, Is the Debt Ceiling Unconstititutional?, THE ATLANTIC WIRE (June 29,
2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2011/06/debt-ceiling-unconstitutional/39408/.

6

See id.

7

E.g., Aaron Blake, Obama Won’t Find Safe Harbor in 14th Amendment, WASHINGTON POST
(June 29, 2011, 12:44PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/why-the-14thamendment-is-not-a-good-option-for-obama/2011/07/29/gIQAynPOhI_blog.html
8

See Joe Conason, Exclusive Bill Clinton Interview: I Would Use Constitutional Option to Raise
Debt Ceiling and “Force the Courts to Stop Me,” THE NATIONAL MEMO (June 19, 2011
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The nuclear option had its own problems, however. For one thing, it could
backfire. As a hedge against the possibility that the government would later
default on debt issued by a President acting without Congressional authorization,
bond purchasers might demand very high rates of interest for the “radioactive”
bonds, thus destabilizing rather than calming financial markets.9 But even if the
President’s unilateral authorization of new debt would pacify the markets, it
would apparently avoid a violation of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment
only by violating separation of powers.10 After all, Article I of the United States
Constitution gives to Congress, not the President, the power “To borrow Money
on the credit of the United States.”11
Thus, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner quickly announced that the
Administration would not rely on the Section 4 nuclear option.12 Perhaps that was
simply a ploy to increase pressure on Congress to strike a deal. If so, it worked,
because at the eleventh hour Congress did indeed pass legislation raising the debt
ceiling and punting to a newly created bi-partisan congressional “supercommittee” the question of how to achieve the deficit reduction that was also
mandated by the legislation.13 With the super-committee now having failed to
send a legislative proposal to Congress for consideration, automatic spending cuts
will occur, unless Congress enacts superseding legislation.14
The foregoing events will likely have important political and economic
implications, but this Article focuses mostly on the constitutional questions that
were raised in the days and weeks before Congress reached its crisis-delaying deal
in August, 2011. With influential members of Congress having indicated that
they intend to use the debt ceiling as leverage in future battles over fiscal policy, a
replay of the debt-ceiling standoff remains a very live possibility. Moreover, the
summer 2011 crisis raised an important, but mostly unrecognized, issue in
constitutional law more generally: What should government officials do when all
of their options are unconstitutional? This Article uses the 2011 debt ceiling
crisis as a case study to begin to explore that question.
12:03AM), http://www.nationalmemo.com/article/exclusive-former-president-bill-clinton-says-hewould-use-constitutional-option-raise-debt.
9

Cf. Bruce Bartlett, The Debt Limit Options President Obama Can Use, THE FISCAL TIMES (Apr.
29, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2011/04/29/The-Debt-Limit-Option-PresidentObama-Can-Use.aspx (noting the rapid turnover of three-month Treasury bills should quickly
resolve these fears and limit the impact of the problem).
10

See Laurence H. Tribe, A Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A23.

11

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see Tribe, supra note 10.

12

See This Week (ABC television broadcast July 24, 2011), transcript available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-timothy-geithner/story?id=14147682; See also
Letter from George W. Madison, Gen. Counsel, Treasury Dep’t, to New York Times (July 8,
2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/FACT-CHECK-TreasuryGeneral-Counsel-George-Madison-Responds-to-New-York-Times-Op-Ed-on-14thAmendment.aspx

13

See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, §401, 125 Stat. 240, 259 (2011).

14

See id. at §302, 125 Stat. at 256.
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Under a plausible description of the options President Obama would have
faced had Congress failed to strike a debt-ceiling deal in August, 2011, every
realistic option open to him would have violated some constitutional provision:
Failure to pay bondholders, contractors, employees, and other persons entitled to
money under federal law would violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and, in addition, the President’s obligation to “take Care that the Laws” creating
the relevant obligations “be faithfully executed”;15 issuing new debt without
congressional authorization would violate separation of powers; so too would
other unilateral actions to increase government revenue, such as a Presidential
decree raising taxes or a Presidential sale of government property without
congressional authorization;16 simply printing additional dollars and crediting
them to the government’s account would violate the federal statute that limits the
amount of money in circulation,17 along with the power reserved to Congress to
coin money and regulate the value thereof,18 and thus could be said to violate
separation of powers and the Take Care Clause as well.
To be sure, legitimate arguments can be made for the conclusion that
President Obama would have had some constitutional options even if Congress
had not acted in August, 2011. Some commentators argue that Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment only bars a limited category of defaults—failure to pay
bondholders but not other obligees (for example, Social Security recipients) in
one view,19 or more narrowly still, only failure to pay principal but not interest on
federal bonds.20 Other commentators have advanced exotic solutions, such as
Professor Jack Balkin’s arresting suggestion that the United States could mint two
one-trillion-dollar platinum coins, or sell the Federal Reserve an “exploding
option” to purchase government property for two trillion dollars, and then keep
15

U.S. Const., art. II, § 3.

16

See U.S. CONST., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States”).
17

See 31 U.S.C § 5115(b) (2006) (“The amount of United States currency notes outstanding and
in circulation . . . may not be more than $300,000,000”).

18

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.

19

See Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 Tulsa
L.J. 561, 580 (1997) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets]; Michael Abramowicz,
Train Wrecks, Budget Deficits, and the Entitlements Explosion: Exploring the Implications of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Public Debt Clause 43-45 (Geo. Wash. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper
No. 575, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1874746
[hereinafter Abramowicz, Train Wrecks]; John Berlau, Constitutional Nonsense on Debt, NAT’L
REV. ONLINE (July 8, 2011, 12:00PM), www.nationalreview.com/articles/271329/constitutionalnonsense-debt-john-berlau.
20

Cf. Garrett Epps, Our National Debt ‘Shall Not Be Questioned,’ THE ATLANTIC (May 4, 2011
7:00AM)
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/05/our-national-debt-shall-not-bequestioned-the-constitution-says/238269/ (mentioning that perhaps only outright repudiation of
obligations is barred, but not temporary default or delay in payment); Michael Stern, Threatening
Default,
POINT
OF
ORDER
(July
1,
2011
6:04PM),
http://www.pointoforder.com/2011/07/01/threatening-default-a-response-to-professor-balkin/
(arguing that there is a difference between default and the questioning the validity of public debt).
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the money (credited to the government’s account by the Federal Reserve) after the
option expires (or explodes).21 We explore these and related exotica below22
because they help contextualize the issue, but our analysis suggests that the
President’s only realistic options were all unconstitutional. At a minimum, we
are willing to assume that that is true. If it turns out not to have been true in 2011,
it may well be true in future crises.
The Article proceeds in four further Parts. Part II describes in greater
detail the nature of the options that confronted President Obama in the summer of
2011. It elaborates on an exchange of views between Professor Laurence Tribe
and one of the current authors that first appeared in essays in the New York
Times,23 the online magazine Verdict,24 and the eponymous blog of the other of
the current authors,25 to show that the real issue was not whether the debt ceiling
limit violated Section Four of the Fourteenth Amendment, but which
unconstitutional option the President ought to have chosen had the day of
reckoning arrived.
Part III answers that question. For simplicity, we focus on three options
and rank them in order, based on different criteria, from worst to least bad. We
conclude that the nuclear option would have been the President’s least bad option.
Readers may be surprised at our further conclusion. We tentatively suggest that a
unilateral tax increase by the President comes in second place, less bad than the
option that the President and nearly every other politician appeared to favor:
unilaterally cutting spending.
Part IV draws general lessons about how the President and other
government officials should choose among unconstitutional options. We contend
that the task of a government official in choosing among unconstitutional options
is to choose the “least unconstitutional” one, rather than simply to make a policy
choice. Policy considerations inevitably inform the analysis of what counts as
least unconstitutional, in part because the Constitution itself nowhere allows that
government officials may sometimes be required to disobey one or more
provisions in order to satisfy one or more other provisions. Nonetheless, the
decision whether to violate one rather than another constitutional provision (or to
violate a single provision in one way rather than another) is not, in our view, to be
21

See Jack M. Balkin, 3 Ways Obama Could Bypass Congress, CNN (July 28, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-28/opinion/balkin.obama.options_1_debt-ceiling-congress-coins.
31 U.S.C. §5112 (k) grants the Secretary of the Treasury the discretion over the denomination and
issuance of platinum bullion coins, which could arguably be used to circumvent this statutory limit
over currency notes.

22

See infra, Part IV.

23

See Tribe, supra note 10Error! Bookmark not defined..

24

See Neil H. Buchanan, The Debt Ceiling is Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professor Tribe,
(July
11,
2011),
http://verdict.justia.com/2011/07/11/the-debt-ceiling-law-isVERDICT
unconstitutional; see also Neil H. Buchanan, The Debt Limit Crisis, VERDICT (July 7, 2011),
http://verdict.justia.com/2011/07/07/the-debt-limit-crisis.
25

See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, Professor Tribe Replies to Professor Buchanan Replying to Professor
Tribe Replying to . . . , DORF ON LAW, (July 21, 2011 12:20 AM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/07/professor-tribe-replies-to-professor.html
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decided by an all-things-considered policy judgment. Instead, as we explain at
greater length in Part IV, distinctively constitutional policies—such as
preservation of the balance of powers among the branches—should be given extra
weight. We also explore whether the least unconstitutional option ought, in virtue
of that fact, to be deemed constitutional. We ultimately disapprove of such posthoc re-labeling because it risks obscuring real conflicts among constitutional
requirements and values.
Part V concludes.
II.

The Budget Process, the Debt Ceiling, and the Political Crisis

To understand the nature of the choices President Obama nearly faced in
the summer of 2011, and the choices that a future President could face should the
crisis recur, this Part begins by placing the budget standoff in context. In this Part
we show how the debt ceiling operates in tandem with a larger web of statutory
and constitutional constraints on Presidential action.
A. The Annual Federal Budget
The federal government of the United States is funded on an annual cycle,
with the political branches engaged each year in a process that plays a large role
in determining the levels of spending and tax collection that the government may
undertake.26 Those policy decisions, in combination with other, longer-term
policy decisions, determine who receives various benefits and who bears certain
burdens, as a result of the various programs and activities funded and operated by
the federal government, and the means by which funds to finance the government
are collected.27 Taken together, the short-term and long-term policies also shape,
to a very important degree, the level and nature of economic activity at any given
time, as well as the likely path of future economic growth, the extent of
environmental harms and remediation, the provision of education at all levels, and
a myriad of other variables that affect the lives of current and future citizens.
The budget process is, therefore, political in every sense of the word.
Federal budgetary decisions matter deeply in the day-to-day lives of people, and
they often determine the political fates of members of Congress and the
President.28 And as the political culture has become less cooperative over the past
26

See generally 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (2006) (detailing the requirements for the yearly budget
submitted by the President).

27

Annual decisions do not fully determine spending and taxing levels, because some spending (socalled “entitlements”) and most of the tax code is enacted in statutes that remain in force from year
to year. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 401 (a) & (b) (2006) (appropriating funds collected out of various
income taxes to the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance trust fund as well as the Federal
Disability insurance trust fund).

28

See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 3 (3d ed. 2007) (“In
national politics, it is now the age of budgeting.”)
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few decades, the budgetary process has come under increasing strain.29 It is thus
increasingly likely that we will soon enter uncharted territory, with budgetary
gridlock forcing the President to take actions that test constitutional limits.
B. The Debt Ceiling’s Purported Limitation on Borrowing
The annual federal budget authorizes government agencies to carry out
functions that require the expenditure of funds.30 When a budget is passed, the
Treasury Department is authorized to issue funds under the federal government’s
array of programs and contracts.31 The budget must include both the authority to
undertake specific activities (to build bridges, to pay medical benefits, and so on),
and the appropriation of money to spend on those activities.32
The final appropriations bills thus provide the legal authority to take
money that is in the federal government’s possession and spend it on authorized
programs. The money in the government’s possession at any moment includes
revenues collected from taxation and other sources (such as various fees).33 If the
money available at any given moment is inadequate to fund the appropriated
programs, the law authorizes the Treasury to borrow funds sufficient to cover the
shortfall.34 If the current levels of appropriated spending fall short of annual
revenues (that is, if the government runs a surplus), the remaining funds are used
to repay previously issued debt obligations, as those debt obligations come due.35
Each year’s budget process, therefore, implies a change in the overall level
of outstanding federal debt.36 If appropriated spending exceeds authorized taxes,
then Treasury is instructed to borrow more money, under Congress’s Article I
29

Id. at 2-4, 108-110 (noting increased political gridlock as federal budget size grew).

30

Generally, federal agencies cannot use funds until they have been appropriated, whether that is
via the yearly budget or some other statutory authorization. See 31 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006) (“An
agency in existence for more than one year may not use amounts otherwise available for
obligation to pay its expenses without a specific appropriation or specific authorization by law.”)

31

See 31 U.S.C. §321 (a) – (a)(3) (“The Secretary of the Treasury shall . . . issue warrants for
money drawn on the Treasury consistent with appropriations”).

32

See § 1105 (a)(12)-(22).

33

See § 3302(b) (requiring deposit of all public funds into the Treasury); § 3720 (requiring money
collected by other agencies to be deposited with the Treasury). For an example of the various fees
collected by the Treasury, see the FOIA fee schedule detailed by 31 C.F.R. § 1.7 (2012).

34

See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3104 (a) (2006) (“The Secretary of the Treasury may borrow on the credit
of the United States Government amounts necessary for expenditures authorized by law . . .”); §
3102 (a) (allowing the Treasury Secretary to issue bonds); § 3103 (a) (allowing the Treasury
Secretary to issue notes).

35

Net repayment of debt last occurred during the late Clinton administration, as the public debt
shrank from $3,772.3 billion dollars in 1997 to $3,319 billion dollars in 2001. See CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 126 (2010), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10871&type=1.
36

Reflecting this reality, every federal budget must include an up to date report to Congress on the
level of federal debt. See § 1105(a)(10) & (36).
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power to borrow money on the credit of the United States.37 This instruction
includes borrowing any funds necessary to repay the principal and interest on the
debt obligations from previous years that have come due, allowing the aggregate
level of debt to rise even while the federal government honors its contractual
commitments to its creditors.38
From an economic perspective, the annual change in the aggregate level of
the federal government’s debt, therefore, is necessarily determined by the
difference between spending and tax revenues authorized in the annual budget.39
If, for example, the total debt is ten trillion dollars at the beginning of the fiscal
year, and spending appropriations exceed tax revenues by one trillion dollars
during the fiscal year, then the debt will go up to eleven trillion dollars (putting
aside daily compounding of interest and similar factors). The budget itself both
determines the necessary change in aggregate borrowing, and authorizes engaging
in any new borrowing that is required to carry out the will of Congress, as
expressed in its duly-enacted budget.
In that way, there has always been an informal “debt ceiling.” That is,
when Congress and the President each year determine the levels of spending and
revenues, they also determine the path of the national debt. The debt will be as
high as Congress permits, and no higher. Various agencies of the federal
government issue estimates of how any budget will change the aggregate level of
debt, providing that information to Congress, the President, and the public as part
of the negotiations over each year’s budget choices.40 Subject to unexpected
changes in the economic conditions that can alter tax revenues or require different
levels of expenditures, 41 the passage of a new budget is necessarily a statement
that the government is planning to owe a certain amount of money at each point in
time.
Even though the budget process itself is both necessary and sufficient to
empower Congress to limit the government’s debt, the total level of debt has
become a politically salient (albeit highly inaccurate) measure of the
government’s “fiscal responsibility.”42 As the national debt level has risen over
37

See supra note 34.

38

See § 3111, allowing the Treasury to issue new obligations in order to redeem or refund
outstanding bonds, notes, bills, and certificates.

39

See, e.g., JACQUELINE MURRAY BRUX, ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY 393 (4th ed. 2008).

40

See § 1105 (a)(21)(B); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES:
FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 115-118 (2012) [hereinafter Analytical
Perspectives],
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/spec.pdf
41

See, e.g., Analytical Perspectives, supra note 39, at 119.

42

See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. H5678 (daily ed. July 28, 2011) (statement of Rep. McNerney)
(“Democrats and Republicans agree that raising the Federal debt is unsustainable, that the default
is absolutely unacceptable, and that we must set our country on a course of fiscal responsibility”);
157 CONG. REC. H5854-55 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2011) (statements of Rep. Reed) (“Mr. Speaker,
$14.4 trillion; $1.6 trillion every year added onto that national debt. The people in November,
2010, spoke loudly. . . . They want us to get our fiscal house in order.”)
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time, politicians and the public have expressed concern that this trend might harm
the economy, now or in the future.43 This concern is often manifested in claims
that the debt level is impoverishing “our children and grandchildren,”44 who will
purportedly bear the burdens of the nation’s debt, yet receive none of the benefits
of the activities that gave rise to the debt.45
In the face of concerns that the debt might be rising in an uncontrolled
fashion—even though, as noted, Congress maintains complete control over the
level and path of federal debt—Congress began in the early Twentieth Century to
impose a purported limit on total federal debt. Originally enacted in 1917,46 and
imposed in its current form beginning in 1939,47 the debt ceiling law48 imposes an
upper limit on the face amount of debt that the U.S. government can owe at any
time.
This limit is, however, imposed in a peculiar fashion. It includes in the
total measure of the debt owed by the federal government the value of loans that
the federal government has made to itself.49 That is, when the government’s
internal accounts treat interagency obligations as “government borrowing”
(without noting that the government is also lending money), then that accounting
convention increases the debt of the United States, as defined by the debt ceiling
statute.50 Moreover, with the economy growing over time, the government’s
ability to finance its obligations improves as well. The debt ceiling, however, is
43

See Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Frustration with Congress Could Hurt
Republican Incumbents 17 (2011) (finding that 76 percent of respondents believe that the debt is a
“major threat” to the national economy), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacypdf/12-15-11%20Congress%20and%20Economy%20release.pdf.

44

See, e.g., 175 CONG. REC. H7637 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2011) (statement of Rep. McCaul) (“Our
debt burden in this country is so heavy, it is no longer simply a financial issue; it is a moral issue.
We have spent and spent, racking up astronomical debt that will dampen the American Dream for
our children and grandchildren”).
45

This is a grossly inaccurate view of the underlying reality, in no small part because money
borrowed today may be put to productive use that will benefit those very children and
grandchildren, as, for example, if the government purchases land they can use for recreation or
pays teachers to educate them. But this is not the place for us to argue against the view that the
government faces a long-term fiscal crisis or to suggest that even if such a crisis looms, efforts to
redress it should be delayed until a period of sustained economic growth. The salient point is that
the widespread perception of the need for deficit-reduction has been lately driving federal
budgetary priorities.

46

See Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288 (1917).

47

See Pub. L. No. 76-201 (1939); D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 31967, THE DEBT LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 4 (2011).
48

31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006).

49

See SCHICK, supra note 28, at 124.

50

This is not an insignificant sum. At the end of Fiscal Year 2011, gross federal debt was
approximately $15.5 trillion, while the debt actually held by the public (which includes all lenders,
foreign and domestic, as well as the Federal Reserve System), was approximately $9.9 trillion.
See US Federal Debt by Year, USGOVERNMENTSPENDING.COM (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/federal_debt. The difference—more than one-third of
gross debt—was mostly the internal obligations in the Social Security Trust Funds.
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denominated in dollars, rather than as a percentage of national income,51 which
effectively lowers the debt ceiling over time, unless Congress acts to increase it.
As history has unfolded in the years since the debt ceiling statute was first
enacted, Congress has generally acted to increase the debt ceiling as necessary, in
line with the new accumulated borrowing needs implied by annual budgets.52
Prior to 2011, there were brief political standoffs over proposed increases in the
debt ceiling, with Congresses under the control of one political party using the
debt ceiling vote to try to extract concessions from a President of the opposite
party53—or simply using the debt ceiling vote as a moment to make speeches
about fiscal responsibility.54 While these standoffs have arisen occasionally over
the decades, the mid-2011 political crisis was the first time that it appeared that
Congress might simply refuse to increase the debt ceiling, even though its own
budget required more borrowing to fund its required spending levels, given its
decisions about tax revenues.
Although that crisis was ultimately defused, the Minority Leader in the
United States Senate subsequently announced that the debt ceiling would
henceforth become a weapon in budget negotiations.55 No longer will
disagreements over spending, taxes, and borrowing be worked out only through
the budget process itself, with Congress then agreeing to raise the debt ceiling to
comport with the projected increase in debt that its own decisions require.
Congress (or, under certain circumstances, a blocking minority of the Senate)
might in the future refuse to increase the debt limit, engaging in political
brinksmanship to extract concessions on policy from the other party’s leadership.
Such maneuvers differ from the brinksmanship in normal budget negotiations,
where members of Congress can block the government from agreeing to future
obligations, because a refusal to increase the debt ceiling makes it impossible for
the government to honor its current obligations, to which it committed when it
passed its budget.
Furthermore, although the most recent debt ceiling standoff was focused
on federal spending itself—with newly-authorized increases in borrowing tied to
future decreases in spending by the federal government56—there is nothing to
51

See 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (“The face amount of obligations issued under this chapter and the face
amount of obligations whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the United States
Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary of the Treasury), may not be
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See 157 CONG. REC. S5219 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. McConnell) (“[N]ever
again will any President, from either party, be allowed to raise the debt ceiling . . . without having
to engage in the kind of debate we have just come through.”)
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See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, §251A, 125 Stat. 240, 256 (2011); Alan
Silverleib & Tom Cohen, White House, Congressional Leaders Reach Debt Deal, CNN (July 31,
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prevent the debt ceiling from being held hostage to non-budgetary demands. A
sufficiently motivated bloc in Congress could require changes in various social
policies, or national security policies, or any other politically contentious area of
the law, before agreeing to increase the debt ceiling. Such tactics could force the
government to choose between violating its own commitments and making
changes in policies that are unrelated to those existing commitments.
With the emergence of this apparently real threat—that Congress might
one day soon refuse to back up its budgetary commitments with sufficient
borrowing authority—it is now possible to imagine a situation in which Congress
and the President will reach a fatal impasse, failing to agree to increase the debt
ceiling when obligations come due. This would, for the first time, put the United
States government in the position of being politically and legally unable to pay
what is has promised to pay.
C. The Applicability or Irrelevance of Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment
If we reach such an impasse, it will become impossible for the President to
honor his responsibilities under the Constitution to faithfully execute the laws of
the United States. One way to view the problem, should such a crisis arise, is to
say that the existence of the debt ceiling law itself creates the impasse, where
none need exist. Without the debt ceiling, after all, the President could simply
collect the revenues implied by the tax laws, and expend the funds implied by the
appropriations laws, borrowing any necessary additional funds, as authorized by
Congress.57
In this vein, some commentary emerged during the summer of 2011,
suggesting not only that the debt ceiling statute is an unnecessary (and needlessly
dangerous) law, but that its existence might violate the Constitution.58 Section 4
of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part: “The validity of the public
debt of the United States, authorized by law, … shall not be questioned.”59 Under
one plausible reading of that provision, the debt ceiling statute—because it raises
the possibility that the United States will fail to meet some of its legal obligations
to pay money, as promised under the law—will bring the validity of the debt of
2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-31/politics/debt.talks_1_debt-ceiling-debt-deal-deficitreduction.
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2011, 3:56 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/04/the-speech-obama-couldgive-the-constitution-forbids-default/237977/; Jack Balkin, The Legislative History of Section
Four
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment,
BALKINIZATION
(June
30,
2011),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/legislative-history-of-section-four-of.html;
Johnathan
H.
Adler, Is the Debt Limit Constitutional – Part Deux, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 3, 2011,
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the United States into question. If that is true, then the constitutional provision
invalidates the statutory enactment, and the debt ceiling statute must be deemed
invalid. The President would then ignore the debt ceiling, ordering the Treasury
Department to issue debt otherwise authorized by Congress. This reading of the
Constitution, as noted in Part I above, has become known as “the nuclear
option.”60
Although this interpretation is not the only plausible reading of Section 4,
and although (as we discuss below) it is ultimately only one way to conclude that
the debt ceiling must be set aside, there is much to be said for it. The difficulty is
in defining the word “questioned” in a limited and meaningful way. The only
guidance on this question from the Supreme Court was issued during the Great
Depression, in Perry v. United States61:
We regard [Section 4] as confirmatory of a
fundamental principle, which applies as well to the
government bonds in question, and to others duly
authorized by the Congress, as to those issued
before the Amendment was adopted. Nor can we
perceive any reason for not considering the
expression “the validity of the public debt” as
embracing whatever concerns the integrity of the
public obligations.
This language from Perry offers a broad reading of Section 4 that suggests
that the validity of the debt of the United States is brought into question whenever
the government acts, or threatens to act, in a way that suggests that it will not
honor all of its obligations. This is, therefore, a statement recognizing the
possibility (indeed, the likelihood) that holders of federal debt—that is, the people
who have loaned money to the United States—will have reason to seriously
question whether the United States will repay the money that it borrowed, if they
see that the federal government has failed to live up to its other obligations. Even
if the government is currently paying all interest and principal on existing
government debts, current and potential lenders will have reason to question the
validity of the debt if, for example, they observe the federal government refusing
to pay promised Social Security benefits or refusing to reimburse a vendor for
services rendered to the Defense Department.
Under this view, then, the debt ceiling is constitutionally infirm, at least as
applied during a politically manufactured standoff, because its existence causes
the public reasonably to question whether the federal government will soon
choose not to honor its debt commitments. A court that strikes down the debt
ceiling statute or a President who ignores it, under this reading, can guarantee that
the commitments made by the government in its duly-enacted annual budget will
be met.
60

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935).
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Although we have considerable sympathy for the “nuclear option,” we
recognize that the reading of Section 4 that underlies it is not beyond question.
The quoted language from Perry, though appearing in the controlling opinion of
the case, was not endorsed by a majority of the Justices of the Court.62 It is,
therefore, arguably dicta. While we are persuaded that the quoted language is
correct on the merits—that is, that it is dangerously short-sighted not to suspect
that any defaulted obligation will bring into question the validity of the public
debt—the Supreme Court has not definitively endorsed that view in a legally
binding fashion.
In addition, it is plausible to argue that Section 4 should be interpreted
narrowly, especially in light of the circumstances surrounding its enactment in the
aftermath of the Civil War.63 Read in context, Section 4 chiefly targets the worry
that, once fully readmitted to the Union, Senators and Representatives from
Southern States (not to mention President Andrew Johnson) would deliberately
refuse to repay debts incurred in suppressing the Confederate rebellion.64 One
might concede that Section 4’s literal language does not limit the provision’s
application to Civil War debts, but nonetheless take a narrow view of what
constitutes “questioning” or “public debt,” by, for example, treating government
failure to pay vendors for services rendered or entitlement beneficiaries their
statutory benefits as outside the scope of the Amendment.65 Under an extremely
narrow view, bringing the validity of the debt into question would mean that bond
holders would only “question” the validity of the debt if they were told directly
that the government had decided not to pay what it had promised under the terms
of its debt instruments (which are legally-binding contracts).66
Yet still narrower readings are available. Consider the question of
whether the “debt” owed to bond holders means the principal alone, or the
principal plus the interest. The interest payments, after all, only become part of
the national debt when they are paid, and only if they are paid by borrowing
money from other lenders. In that way, interest payments on the debt are no
different from veterans’ benefits, or the salaries of FBI agents.67 None are
currently owed by the federal government, yet all are promised to be paid in the
future under contracts entered into by the federal government.
Even the deceptively simple move of stretching the definition of
“questioned” sufficiently to sweep interest payments into Section 4 is, therefore, a
non-trivial interpretive exercise. We must either allow the Perry language to have
62

The case was decided by a 5-4 vote. Although Justice Stone nominally concurred, rather than
concurring only in the judgment, he wrote separately to indicate that he did not endorse the portion
of the majority opinion in which the discussion of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment
appeared. See Perry, 294 U.S. at 359 (Stone, J., concurring).
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some force, or we absurdly reduce the meaning of Section 4 to the point where
even holders of government debt can be the victims of contractual breach without
ever questioning the validity of the debt. This reductio strongly suggests (at least
to us) that the Perry language—which gives Section 4 something like its natural
every-day meaning—is most plausible, and that the narrower readings are
inappropriately cramped.
Nevertheless, there remains the opposite danger of reading the
constitutional provision too broadly. Even if the word “questioned” should not be
interpreted as narrowly as described above, one can reasonably worry that the
word’s meaning might be inappropriately expanded to include nearly anything
that might make people think twice about the federal government’s
creditworthiness. Surely it would go too far to find a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in any situation in which Congress seems to be unable to act
responsibly. While it is true that an embarrassing public spectacle on the floor of
Congress might make people question whether the federal government is run by
fools, and thus lead them to question whether the government will be forced to
default on its debt at some future time, it is unreasonable to say that every
embarrassing moment on the congressional floor actually violates Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Even under a less expansive reading of Section 4, however, there are still
arguments that are simply wrong. For example, economic libertarians might
argue that the issuance of debt itself could be seen to violate Section 4, because to
issue debt is to raise the possibility that it will not be repaid. The practical import
of that argument is that any increases in public debt (that is, new borrowing, to
cover annual deficits) bring into question the validity of the public debt by
making it possible that the government will not be able to repay the debt.68 Even
in the absence of the debt ceiling, this argument suggests, it is possible for the
federal government to issue so much debt that it will someday be forced to
default.69
This reasoning is flawed, for a very simple reason. All current United
States debt is denominated in dollars, which the federal government alone is
empowered to create.70 Therefore, when the federal government issues new debt,
lenders know that they will be repaid with dollars, and that the entity to which
they loaned money can create those dollars as its own means of repayment.71
68

See Ron Paul, Default Now, or Suffer a More Expensive Crisis Later, BLOOMBERG (July 22,
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That is why, until the summer of 2011, financial markets have treated United
States debt securities as the equivalent of cash.72 When a security denominated in
dollars is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, there should be
no risk of default.73
There are, of course, policy and prudential reasons why a government
might not wish to embark on a path that will require the creation of too much
money, which is why all debt securities (public and private) face inflation risk.74
Until now, only federal debt securities have carried no default risk.75 Here, the
key term from Section 4 is not “questioned” but rather “validity.” As a technical
matter, the validity of the debt securities of the United States is beyond question,
unless Congress arbitrarily prevents the Treasury from doing what is necessary to
honor those debts by imposing a binding debt ceiling.
In short, despite a legitimate range of reasonable disagreement over the
meaning of Section 4, we think it is best read to obligate the federal government
to pay all of its obligations but not to limit federal borrowing. Thus, during an
impasse of the sort that was narrowly avoided in August, 2011, Section 4 would
require the President to refuse to honor the debt ceiling, if doing so would cause
the government to fail to meet any of its financial obligations in a timely manner.
But, as we now explain, a Presidential decision to avoid violating Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment would not necessarily ensure that the President avoided
violating other constitutional obligations.
D. Is the Debt Ceiling Really the Source of the Problem?
Notwithstanding the controversy over the meaning of Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, however, there is an independent argument—one that
does not rely upon the Fourteenth Amendment at all—that leads to the conclusion
that a President must violate the debt ceiling in order to carry out the terms of the
annual budget.
In his popular writings about the debt ceiling crisis during the summer of
2011, Professor Tribe pointed out that the debate might have been inappropriately
focused on the debt ceiling law in isolation, rather than viewed in the broader
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context in which the debt ceiling might become binding.76 If we conceive of the
annual budget process as creating two laws—a tax law, and a spending law—then
it is not the debt ceiling alone that causes any Fourteenth Amendment problem,
but rather the arithmetic implications of the three laws in combination—the
difference between tax collections and expenditures, relative to any remaining
room under the debt ceiling.77
Under this view, even if one accepts our Perry-based argument above
regarding the meaning of “questioning” the validity of the debt, it is wrong to
blame the debt ceiling specifically for any problems that arise during a budget
stalemate. We could, for example, say that the tax law violates the Constitution,
because it fails to collect sufficient revenues to make an increase in the debt
ceiling unnecessary. Similarly, the spending law brings the validity of the debt
into question, by obligating the government to spend more money than it can raise
from authorized taxes and authorized borrowing.
There is, as we discuss further in Part III below, much to this argument.
Even so, it is worth considering the unique nature of the debt ceiling law, to
determine whether there is anything to the idea that there is a unique problem with
the debt ceiling that would make it—and it alone—constitutionally problematic.
As noted earlier, the debt ceiling is a relatively recent invention.78 The
nation existed for well over a century without a debt ceiling, passing annual
budgets that combined taxes and spending in various amounts. Although the
federal government and its debt were both relatively small during that time
period, the debt did exist, and it did fluctuate over time, in response to differences
in taxing and spending.
The debt ceiling, therefore, is an appendage that was added to the system
long after the federal government had been operating successfully. To be sure,
fiscal conservatives may view the debt ceiling as a very useful appendage. Each
time the debt approaches the debt ceiling, citizens and politicians who believe that
government is too large can use that fact to impose fiscal discipline in two ways:
First, as in the 2011 impasse, they can demand concessions from their political
adversaries as the price of agreeing to raise the debt ceiling; and second, they can
make their case to the public that the need to raise the debt ceiling reflects
government profligacy. Never mind that the charge need not be true: Even if the
ratio of debt to GDP shrinks, and even if the government only runs deficits that
are sustainable over the long term, economic growth will mean that Congress
repeatedly runs up against the limit of the dollar-denominated debt ceiling. The
important point is that the debt ceiling is a visible and useful tool for imposing
fiscal discipline—whether needed or not. And so for those who believe that fiscal
discipline is needed, the debt ceiling may serve an important function.
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But even granting that, the debt ceiling is hardly essential for imposing
fiscal discipline. As noted above, fiscal discipline, or any other plausible policy
goal that the debt ceiling might help to accomplish, can be achieved in the
absence of the debt ceiling.79 If Congress and the President think that the debt is
too high, then they can combine tax increases and spending reductions to address
that problem.
By contrast, the federal government could not function without spending
laws and tax laws. Those laws must be specific enough to allow the executive
branch to know how to spend money, and from whom to collect how much in
revenues. Allowing the debt ceiling to override one or both of the tax and
spending laws would, therefore, create a legal vacuum, leaving the executive
branch without guidance from the legislative branch about how to change taxes or
spending, while maintaining a level of debt below the ceiling.80
We do not, however, view this argument as essential to our ultimate
conclusion. While there are strong reasons to view the debt ceiling as a “lesser”
law than the tax and spending laws, it is sufficient for our purposes to accept
Professor Tribe’s point that there is an interaction problem among the laws. And
as we explain in the next Part, the problem is not simply that the laws conflict, but
that they conflict in a way that gives the President no constitutional options. Once
one recognizes that a President cannot simultaneously carry out all three laws,
without violating the Constitution, it is necessary to determine how a President
should decide which law to set aside. With nothing but unconstitutional choices,
what should a President do?
III.
The President’s Trilemma: Which Duty Must He Ignore,
When He Faces Three Unconstitutional Choices?
The interaction of the spending law, the tax law, and the debt ceiling law
potentially creates an unsolvable problem. For example, if Congress were to
authorize spending that exceeds tax collections by one trillion dollars in a year, at
a time when the existing federal debt is only one-half trillion dollars below its
statutory ceiling, then the President could not execute all three laws as written.
Faced with that impossible choice, the President risks impeachment no matter
what he might do, because he will have failed to execute at least one duly-enacted
law of the United States.81 He thus faces a “trilemma”: choosing one of three bad
79
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options, all of which are unconstitutional.82 While it is also possible for the
President to combine unilateral actions on taxes, spending, and debt, we find it
more useful to discuss the three separately. This Part offers constitutional and
prudential grounds in support of the conclusion that, faced with the trilemma, the
President should set aside the debt ceiling law. Then Part IV draws broader
lessons about the criteria the President and other actors should use for choosing
among unconstitutional options.
A. Three Powers Reserved to Congress
Article I of the Constitution grants to Congress, rather than to the
President, all three powers at play in this debate: taxing, spending, and
borrowing.83 Under Section 8, Congress has “power to lay and collect taxes,” to
“borrow money on the credit of the United States,” and to “provide for the . . .
general Welfare” through the expenditure of money.84
While there are timeless controversies over the extent of Congress’s
powers under Article I,85 the point here is that any such powers are in Congress’s
hands, not the President’s, at least absent a valid delegation by Congress to the
President. For a President to choose unilaterally to collect taxes in a way not
authorized by Congress, or to spend money in a way not authorized by Congress,
or to borrow money in amounts not authorized by Congress, violates the
separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.86
If Congress, either by choice or by default, puts the President in the
position of having to violate his oath of office, how should the President proceed?
The most aggressive approach would be for the President simply to assume all
powers otherwise reserved to Congress, on the theory that he cannot be expected
to obey the contradictory dictates of a dysfunctional body.
82
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But this framing of the question may be misleading. Congress does not
act alone, and so the President may share responsibility for its dysfunction. Did
the President sign the budget bill that put Congress on a collision course with the
debt ceiling? Did he threaten to veto a bill raising the debt ceiling if it contained
(or did not contain) some other provision he disapproved (or insisted upon)? The
trilemma occurs as a result of a systemic failure rather than simply from
Congressional dysfunction.
Moreover, as we elaborate at greater length in Part IV, even if the
President bears no substantial responsibility for the trilemma, the better approach
is to determine the path that would do the least violence to the constitutional
prerogatives of Congress, allowing the President to engage in the most minimal
course of action possible, while doing everything possible to allow the Congress
later to undo what the President does, if Congress ultimately determines that the
President’s extraordinary (but necessary) exercise of power was unwise.
This suggests that Congress itself could provide guidance regarding its
priorities among the three possible courses of action, explaining or revealing
which of the three powers it cares about the least. Naturally, any such analysis is
comparative, because Congress should rightly be concerned about guarding all of
its enumerated powers. The question is not which choice is best, but which is
least bad.
Among the three possibilities, the taxing power would seem to be the most
important power reserved to Congress.87 From the founding, the notion of limited
government was, in significant part, a commitment to a limitation on the power to
tax.88 “No taxation without representation” is only the most memorable of the
expressions of this idea, reserving to the people’s representatives the power to
collect taxes.89 That power is also the first of Congress’s powers listed in Section
8 of Article I.90 Certainly, we are unaware of any situation in which a President
has attempted to collect taxes without authorization by Congress; and it is difficult
indeed to imagine any Congress acceding to such a usurpation of its powers.
Regarding the spending power, the picture is a bit more nuanced. In the
early years of the Republic, Congress passed laws that authorized the President to
spend “up to” certain sums of money, and the President would accordingly be
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See, e.g., Tucker v. Ferguson, 89 U.S. 527, 575 (1874) (“The taxing power is vital to the
functions of government. It helps to sustain the social compact and to give it efficacy. It is
intended to promote the general welfare. It reaches the interests of every member of the
community.”).

88

See Charles Lockhart, American and Swedish Tax Regimes: Cultural and Structural
Roots, 35 COMP. POL. 379, 385, 391–92 (2003) (explaining that the United States’ tax revenues
remain low in relation to other industrial countries because of its historical “fidelity to a neoLockean conception of limited government” which stems from the time of the American
Revolution).

89

See e.g., Judge Grant Dorfman, The Founders’ Legal Case: “No Taxation Without
Representation” Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008) (noting that
the phrase has become the “’mother’s milk’ of American history education”).
90

U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8.

Page 20 of 55

Lessons of the Debt Ceiling Standoff

able to carry out his constitutional duties while spending money in amounts not
precisely specified by Congress.91
In most areas of the federal budget, however, that practice has long since
ended. Congress now typically specifies precise amounts of money (or, in the
case of so-called entitlement programs, precise formulae to determine the
amounts of money to be spent) that the President must spend for each authorized
program.92 When Congress appropriates the money necessary to fund those
authorized programs, it effectively orders the President to spend no more and no
less than those amounts. It would be odd, indeed, if a President were to assert that
he could choose to, say, send Medicare beneficiaries less money than they would
be entitled to receive under the relevant statute.
Moreover, we need not speculate about what would happen if a President
were to assert such authority. The impoundment controversy during the Nixon
Administration involved a direct confrontation between the executive and
legislative branches, with Congress objecting to Nixon’s theory of an “imperial
Presidency,” in which the President would have the power to selectively reduce
certain spending programs at his discretion.93
The result was the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, under which the
President may only propose “rescissions” of appropriated spending.94 Congress,
however, need not act on such proposals, and the President’s power to withhold
funds ends after forty-five days.95 Congress, therefore, has made a strong
statement of principle, affirming its power under the Constitution to set the exact
sums of money to be spent on each program, not merely the upper limits.
Arguably, moreover, the Impoundment Control Act was unnecessary to
affirm Congress’s powers. While other provisions of that law have surely helped
to create mechanisms for resolving disputes among the branches, lower courts
ruled uniformly against President Nixon’s attempts to impound funds, on
constitutional grounds, even before Congress acted.96 Passage of the Act mooted
91
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those cases before they reached the Supreme Court, but the fundamental idea that
the power to spend implies the power to spend in exact amounts is persuasive, in
our view, and also strongly implied by the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the
Line Item Veto Act in Clinton v. City of New York.97
For the immediate purpose of determining Congress’s priorities, however,
it is the passage of the Impoundment Control Act itself that provides useful
guidance for future controversies. Congress has demonstrated, both by passing
the Act and by refusing to grant subsequent presidential rescission requests, that it
wishes to guard its power to spend against presidential encroachment.
Finally, what about Congress’s power to authorize the borrowing of
money? The existence of the debt ceiling law, of course, suggests that Congress
wishes to limit the amount of money that the government can borrow.98 In
practice, however, Congress has generally treated the debt ceiling as a symbolic
measure or at most, a bargaining chip. Each time an increase in the debt ceiling
has been resisted, it was generally understood that the dollar limit of the debt
ceiling was being used opportunistically.99 Even President Obama, when he
served in the Senate, once voted against a debt ceiling increase, with no indication
that he was doing so because of concerns about the specific limit involved.100
Taking a stand on the national debt was politically useful, but no one doubted that
Congress would ultimately raise the debt ceiling.
Yet this line of reasoning might suggest the importance of the debt ceiling
in case of a real impasse. That is, if Congress ever actually were to refuse to raise
the debt ceiling, then that would be a surprising and unmistakable statement that it
cares deeply about the level of debt. As we argue below, however, it is difficult
to reconcile that inference with Congress having passed tax and spending laws
that would otherwise require an increase in the debt. In any case, Congress’s
refusal to change any of the three laws—which is the situation that gives rise to
this entire analysis—gives us no reason to think that it cares more about its power
to limit borrowing than about its other powers. At most, through a failure to raise
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the debt ceiling, Congress could be read to be saying that it no longer cares less
about protecting its borrowing powers.
It is not surprising that reading Congress’s collective mind regarding these
foundational principles is difficult. Each specific power granted to Congress
under the Constitution is important on its own merits. As a comparative matter,
however, it is difficult not to view the debt ceiling as the least important
manifestation of Congress’s efforts to protect its prerogatives, as we now
elaborate.
B. Rules of Interpretation, As Applied to the Debt Ceiling Controversy
When legal provisions are in conflict, or in cases of ambiguity, various
interpretive doctrines are available to resolve the issues at stake. In the case of the
debt ceiling, the two most useful doctrines both point in the same direction,
suggesting that the debt ceiling should give way when it is in conflict with the
taxing and spending provisions of the government’s budget.
The “last in time” rule suggests that Congress’s most recent enactments
provide the best guide to its priorities.101 Congress legislates in light of existing
law, and thus it presumably knows when it is passing new legislation that would
make it impossible for the President to meet his obligations under both the older
and newly-enacted laws.
In the case of the debt ceiling, the Congress in Spring 2011 passed a
budget.102 According to all estimates available at the time, that budget implied
that the government would reach its official debt limit in May, and all of the
executive branch’s permissible delaying tactics would be exhausted by early
August, before the end of the fiscal year.103 Yet the budget called for levels of
spending and taxes that would require increases in the debt to levels beyond the
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statutory limit.104 If the last-in-time doctrine has any purchase here, it leads to the
conclusion that Congress must not have wanted the President to enforce the debt
ceiling. If Congress had cared about the debt ceiling, it had all of the tools
necessary to avoid a conflict that would lead to the President’s trilemma.
Another useful interpretive doctrine states that “the specific dominates the
general.”105 This maxim captures the idea that general statutes adopt policy goals
that have some weight, but that drafters of statutes legislate in more detail when
they mean to specify a particular result. If the general statutes can be carried out
without conflicting with other laws, then they must be followed. If not, however,
then Congress’s attention to detail should trump its more general statements.
Of course, the debt ceiling is in one sense very specific. It states a precise
number beyond which the national debt may not rise.106 But the taxing and
spending laws are much more specific than the debt ceiling statute, in that they
express Congressional will on a host of specific details, rather than just one
number. For the reasons discussed in Part III.D below, that specificity should
strongly point the President towards setting aside the debt ceiling when he is
faced with the trilemma. To put the point briefly, the legislative effort inherent in
the taxing and spending laws represents such a delicate balancing act that we must
presume that Congress’s intent would be frustrated to a much greater degree by a
President who elevates the blunt instrument of the debt ceiling above those other,
highly nuanced laws, than by a President who subordinates the debt ceiling to
Congress’s decisions about spending and taxes.
But suppose Congress wanted the President to observe a hard debt
ceiling—one that would prevail over budget and tax laws that called for spending
that leaves a shortfall which would otherwise necessitate borrowing beyond the
debt ceiling. Does our application of the canons of construction render such a
choice impossible? Hardly.
If Congress really wanted a hard debt ceiling, it could so specify in the
debt ceiling and/or its budget and tax bills. For example, the debt ceiling statute
might state something like the following: “In the event that any future Act
appropriates funds in amounts that cannot be paid without borrowing beyond the
limits of this debt ceiling, such future Act shall be construed to authorize the
President to decline to spend such sums as he, in his sound discretion, deems
appropriate to impound.” That sort of debt ceiling law would work a partial
104
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repeal of the Impoundment Control Act and if Congress were then to pass a
budget that required borrowing beyond the debt ceiling, the budget would be
construed in light of the debt ceiling law as prioritizing budget cuts. But in such a
scenario, the President would not be cutting spending because cutting spending
would be less unconstitutional than ignoring the debt ceiling; in such a scenario,
cutting spending would not be unconstitutional at all (so long as the particular
spending cuts did not violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment or some
other constitutional provision). Put differently, Congress can insist on a hard debt
ceiling, but it may have difficulty prospectively insisting on a hard debt ceiling as
a favored unconstitutional option.
C. The Practical Issues Raised by Presidential Unilateralism
Beyond Congress’s own indications of its priorities, there are practical
questions that arise when considering which of the three powers of Congress the
President might usurp, when faced with a trilemma. Examining the ease or
difficulty of carrying out one or another option might offer guidance about the
President’s best course of action, thereby helping to answer the question of which
unconstitutional option is least unconstitutional. We return to the question of why
such pragmatic considerations bear on the relative measure of unconstitutionality
in Part IV.
1.

When the President Cuts Spending

President Obama, along with many commentators, concluded in the
summer of 2011 that he would be forced to violate the Constitution by spending
less than Congress had authorized and appropriated, in the spending law.107 If he
had followed through, how would that have happened?
Those who were worried about the validity of the public debt—either for
constitutional reasons, or out of concern that failing to pay the nation’s creditors
could create a financial and economic crisis—suggested that the President could
simply set aside funds to pay those obligations that he deemed to be the most
important.108 So long as the President did not use the opportunity to exact
political retribution, or to impermissibly target certain groups in a way that would
violate equal protection, this approach would simply entrust to the President the
power to decide who should not be paid.
107

Of course, the President did not say that spending less than Congress had appropriated would
violate the Constitution, but the conclusion follows from our discussion of the impoundment
controversy. See supra, text accompanying notes 91-97.
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See, e.g., Rep. Tom McClintock, McClintock: Debt Reduction Means Difficult Decisions,
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obligation to prioritize payments to prevent a default. The problem is that a lot of other bills
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legislation proposals made by congressmen that would prioritize the payment of certain
obligations, such as the principal and interest on debt or Social Security benefits, over other
obligations).
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As it turns out, however, doing so would be surprisingly difficult under the
laws and procedures that usually govern federal spending. Because tax revenues
arrive at the Treasury daily, in varying amounts, the government’s ability to pay
its bills without borrowing will depend on which bills happen to come due on the
days when it happens to be collecting sufficient tax revenues.109 A Social
Security check that could not be paid on Tuesday might be payable on
Wednesday. However, even if the Tuesday payment is not made, there will be
other payments that are due on Wednesday. If the amount of tax revenue coming
in during Wednesday would be enough to pay Wednesday’s bills, but not both
Tuesday’s carryovers plus Wednesday’s bills, then someone will still not be paid.
Under current law, if the government has enough money in the Treasury
on any given day to pay the bills that are then due, it must pay those bills.110 The
debt ceiling does not override that requirement, because there would be (by
assumption) sufficient non-borrowed funds to cover the day’s required
expenditure. If the President tried to argue that he must prioritize the older unpaid
bills over the current bills, Wednesday’s would-be recipients could reasonably
argue that there is no principle under the law that authorizes the President to set
priorities in that way. Tuesday’s recipients should, under an equally plausible
argument, be out of luck until there is enough money to pay a particular day’s
recipients plus all unpaid carryover bills. And if such a day never comes, then
there is no reason why the earlier obligations are more binding than the later ones.
The short-term timing of these payment streams is, in most cases, a matter of
happenstance.
The analysis could also be affected by the nature of the payments that are
due. In some cases, a day’s or week’s delay is little more than an annoyance,
while in others, justice delayed is truly justice denied. For example, a person who
is owed money by the federal government could be relying on that money to fund
a down payment on a house, where even a day’s delay can be sufficient to unravel
an entire sale—or even a series of sales, where the seller in one deal expects to
use her proceeds to become the buyer in a related sale. Again, the nearly-random
timing of the specific payment obligations, in conjunction with the equally
random timing of tax receipts, suggests that it would be difficult indeed to create a
principled priority system that forces some recipients to wait while others are
paid.
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This problem would become even more difficult if the President were to
try to hoard funds from day to day, in anticipation of high-priority obligations that
are expected to arise in the near future. For example, if the President knows that
certain interest payments to government bond-holders will be due on Friday, and
he does not expect there to be enough money coming in on Friday to cover those
payments, he might refuse to make payments earlier in the week, even when the
concurrent flow of tax revenues would otherwise be sufficient to cover the
payments due on those days. If Treasury is required to pay money due, when it is
due, so long as there is money on hand, then certainly the disappointed would-be
recipients of those payments could bring actions against the government.
But, one might ask, wouldn’t the President make these decisions at the
wholesale level? The President could establish a formula of the following sort:
Bondholders and military personnel get paid in full; the remaining shortfall is then
made up by an equal percentage cut among all prospective federal payees, based
on Treasury’s projection of the size of the shortfall. Such an algorithm would not
require Treasury or the President to decide whom to pay and how much on a dayby-day basis.
We concede that it is possible to rewrite the laws and procedures to allow
any set of priorities to be met, but the process of doing so requires more changes
to the law and to executive procedures than might at first be obvious. Moreover,
even if the President does not engage in the kinds of impermissible favoritism that
unilateral spending cuts might allow, assumption of the power to choose among
decision procedures greatly expands the power of the President to make choices
that cross the line into policy decisions—without any delegation of that power to
him by Congress. Setting up rules that protect would-be recipients of certain
payments, of course, necessarily disfavors others. For the President to make such
choices without prior Congressional authorization is for him to assume significant
legislative power.111
In short, seemingly simple rules like “across-the-board cuts” or
“prioritization of bond holders” turn out, on the ground, to be anything but simple.
Telling the President to pick winners and losers is both to confer awesome power
and to increase the likelihood of arbitrary harm to innocent parties.
2.

When the President Increases Borrowing

If the President, instead of cutting spending, decides to ignore the debt
ceiling, how would he proceed? The issuance of government debt is significantly
less complicated than the determination of government spending levels, because
debt is a relatively undifferentiated (and completely monetizable) asset. Whereas
spending cuts can result in something as serious as missed chemotherapy
treatments, or as inconsequential as delays in reimbursing a person’s travel
expenses, borrowing money is a simple concept. No one is forced to lend money,
and the government simply borrows as much as it needs to cover its appropriated
111
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Page 27 of 55

Lessons of the Debt Ceiling Standoff

spending, and no more.112 Other than the details of the maturities of the debt
instruments, the process is straightforward and unremarkable.
From an administrative standpoint, therefore, the issuance of debt poses no
difficulties. There are federal employees who regularly go through the process of
issuing new federal debt, using well-established mechanisms to interact with
potential lenders in the financial markets.113 If the President wishes to issue
additional debt, even if that debt would bring the government’s total borrowing
level above the current ceiling, he can easily issue an order to do so. The
recipients of that order would know exactly what to do, without having to make
judgment calls, and without needing to alter any other laws or procedures that are
currently in place.
As a practical matter, therefore, exceeding the debt ceiling is the essence
of simplicity, especially compared to cutting spending. The more difficult
practical question, however, is how the potential lenders to the United States
would react to the offer of new debt securities that appear to violate the borrowing
clause of Article I, Section 8.114 Would such lenders assume that the new debt is
still backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, even though only the
President has authorized the borrowing?
In part, the answer to this question depends upon the degree of political
dysfunction that attends the crisis at hand. If it appears that the negotiations
passed the witching hour by mere bad luck, but that things will soon return to
normal, then it is easy to imagine that the subsequent legislative compromise will
include an after-the-fact guarantee of the validity of what we will call the
“Presidential bonds.” If, however, it appears that the political crisis will be
longer-lasting, then the risk to lenders is higher, making them likely either to
refuse to lend, or to require higher interest payments (thus exacerbating the
government’s long-term borrowing problems).
If the government simply defaults up front, we can expect markets
immediately to respond badly, making it more difficult and expensive to return
the government to its status as a preferred borrower.115 Avoiding default by
issuing potentially illegitimate debt, however, can lead to the same result.116 The
irony, therefore, is that a President’s attempt to avoid default on government
112
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obligations might cause precisely the real-world problem that it is designed to
avoid.
The difference, however, is in degree. A straight default on obligations,
especially debt payments, ends any pretense that the government is a reliable
financial player.117 Issuing bonds of uncertain reliability will almost surely
increase borrowing costs, but any such increase can be no more than the increase
that would attend an up-front default.
Moreover, the underlying factors that could make the Presidential bonds
less valuable are factors that would independently have even more catastrophic
effects on the economy as a whole. If, even after failing to make an eleventh-hour
compromise, Congress and the President still cannot come to an agreement to end
the trilemma, then there will be reason to worry for the future of the nation. Even
the regular budget process, which precedes the possible creation of any trilemmas,
would be so broken as no longer to permit the proper functioning of the
government.
Accordingly, if the President had good reason to conclude that the market
would demand intolerably high interest rates for Presidential bonds, then on that
basis he might appropriately rule out ignoring the debt ceiling as the solution to
the trilemma. But in such a scenario, it would be a policy consideration—the subjunk status of the prospective Presidential bonds—rather than a constitutional
consideration per se, that would take the issuance of new debt off the table.
Conversely, however, if the President had good reason to believe that financial
markets would only demand a tolerably small interest premium for the
Presidential bonds, so that issuing them would make financial sense, then our
analysis suggests that this path should be constitutionally preferred because the
key constitutional consideration—how much legislative power the President must
usurp in order to carry out the solution—favors issuing new debt over canceling
appropriations.
In short, while unauthorized issuance of debt would hardly be ideal, and
would carry with it risks of financial and economic disruption, it would be a more
rational and administrable process than asking the President to enact unauthorized
spending cuts. If it would work, it would thus be a less unconstitutional course
than unilateral Presidential spending cuts for two reasons.118 First, ignoring the
debt ceiling would usurp less legislative authority than would unilateral
Presidential spending cuts, thus making the former a less severe violation of
separation of powers. Second, ignoring the debt ceiling would also prevent the
government from failing to meet its legal obligations to pay its bills and thus
violating Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.119
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3.

When the President Increases Taxes

Finally, what are the practical issues that would arise if the President
resolved the trilemma by increasing taxes, to levels above those authorized by
Congress under the tax law? Taxes lie somewhere between debt and spending in
terms of their heterogeneity. Asking a government to “borrow money” is (again,
other than certain technical matters, especially the maturity dates of the new debt)
a rather unambiguous request. Asking it to “collect taxes” necessarily implicates
a broader range of questions, covering the tax base (that is, what to tax), the rates
of taxation, and the likelihood of tax evasion and avoidance.
Because of these unknowns, the decision to increase taxes automatically
confers powers upon the President (who, throughout this analysis, is assumed to
be acting without authority of Congress), with significant policy implications.
For example, if the President decided to collect the necessary funds by increasing
estate taxes, that would have quite different effects than if he authorized an
increase in excise taxes.
Even so, increasing taxes appears to raise somewhat fewer issues of
complexity than cutting spending. Collecting more money from people than they
expected to pay might cause hardship, and it might unravel some transactions that
would otherwise take place, but the tax collectors would not face all of the types
of questions that budget cutters would face in the scenarios described above.
From a purely administrative standpoint, moreover, collecting more taxes
is fully within the capacities of the agencies over which the President exercises
authority.120 He could, for example, simply instruct the tax authority to increase
withholding on all regular paychecks, under the income tax or the Social Security
and Medicare taxes. This process is fully automated, and the President’s
authorization would be all that was needed to collect additional funds. Some
refusals to pay might follow, but because the employers withholding the taxes are
not paying those taxes, the process could be expected to be administratively
simple.
Deciding to increase the taxes that are easier to collect is, of course, a
policy choice of its own. The burdens would not be shared equally. This would
be one of many reasons that the President would be sure to face fierce political
resistance to any attempt to increase taxes. The administrative simplicity,
however, is a strong argument for increasing taxes, rather than cutting spending,
in the event that the financial markets rule out the possibility of Presidential
bonds.
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See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2329 (arguing
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D. The Prudential Issues Raised by the President’s Choice
The analysis above set aside many policy issues, focusing instead on the
practical implications of each possible solution to the trilemma. At least as
important, however, are the prudential questions that are raised by different types
of unauthorized presidential actions. Such considerations suggest a different set
of tradeoffs, based on the likely effects of a President’s choice, both in the
immediate crisis, and the precedent that he would set for the country going
forward.
The political branches of government are at their most political (in both
good and bad senses) when taxing and spending are involved. While Congress
has agreed over the years to delegate its authority to coin and regulate money,121
for example, it has never allowed technocratic agencies to determine the levels
and types of taxes and spending that the government undertakes. Election
campaigns are often fought over issues of taxes and spending, and any
compromises are designed to trade off important priorities, benefits, and costs.122
When Congress agrees to a spending law, it therefore is making a
statement about the importance of various choices, both absolutely and relatively.
If Congress as a whole determines that there should be a certain level of social
spending versus military spending, for example, it is almost surely true that each
member of Congress would have preferred a different balance. The ultimate
spending bill, therefore, represents in raw form the political balance of power in
any given year.
Similarly, the tradeoffs involved in designing the tax laws is also deeply
political. A Senator who would prefer a pure consumption tax allows the income
tax to continue, on the condition that certain types of saving are exempt from
taxes. A believer in low corporate tax rates negotiates a compromise in which she
allows somewhat higher rates, on the condition that the recognition of certain
corporate income can be deferred. The nature and complexity of the political
choices is limited only by the imaginations of the parties to the negotiations.
Putting the taxing and spending decisions together, as the process of
determining the budget and appropriations proceeds, multiplies the ways in which
the result is best viewed as a set of quid pro quos and understandings that each
121
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Campaign, CAP. J., Sept. 19, 2011 (arguing that taxes are an important issue in every election, but
will be particularly significant in the 2012 election because of the nation’s economic distress),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903374004576580710594126704.html.
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member of Congress expects to be honored. These tradeoffs and balances fully
satisfy no one, of course, but they are hammered out in the atmosphere of a
representative body that is constitutionally empowered to make just such difficult
choices.
The debt ceiling could be viewed as merely part of this mixture of
tradeoffs. When Congress passed the 2011 budget in spring 2011,123 perhaps it
did so in the full knowledge that what its members were agreeing upon would
never be enacted. If that were true, however, it would suggest that the debt
ceiling was being used as a bait-and-switch mechanism, with one side acting in
bad faith, never intending to honor the compromises over taxing and spending to
which it had agreed.
In any event, the question posed by the trilemma is not whether the will of
Congress might be frustrated by the President’s choice about how to proceed.
The key issue is which choice least threatens Congress’s higher priorities. If
Congress passes a budget that implies a level of borrowing, yet it also leaves in
place prior legislation that purports to forbid that new level of borrowing, a
President who ignores the debt ceiling will honor the most recent—and, we would
argue, most important—of Congress’s stated priorities, allowing the absolute and
relative magnitudes of taxes and spending mandated by Congress to be carried
out.
The worst that can happen in such a case is that Congress would need to
undo the damage in a future budget. That is, if the President’s guess is incorrect,
and Congress’s highest priority was to prevent the national debt from exceeding a
certain dollar amount, then Congress has the power to pass budgets in future years
with surpluses sufficient to return to the debt level that it prefers.124 The damage
that might be wrought in the meantime, or by having to live under a more austere
budget in future years than otherwise, is a cost of ignoring Congress’s will today.
The costs of allowing a President to violate the balance of Congress’s priorities in
taxing and spending, however, are much more difficult to undo.
Finally, the prudential tradeoffs inherent in the trilemma can be framed as
a question of how much power each choice confers on the President. For the
foregoing reasons, it seems clear that the President would minimize his
assumption of power by issuing debt than by rebalancing taxing and spending
choices. Or, to put it in partisan political terms, which choice would be the least
worrisome, from the standpoint of a member of Congress who is not from the
President’s party? While reasonable people might offer different answers to that
question, giving the President the power with the least latitude—and that is most
easily reversed—strikes us as the prudent choice, no matter which parties control
the various political bodies.
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See Hook, supra note 57.
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Indeed, as noted above, see supra text accompanying notes 106-107, Congress can even
prospectively couple a “hard” debt ceiling with a delegation to the President of the power to
impound appropriated spending.
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E. The Hierarchy of Choices
Our analysis, therefore, is not designed to favor one party or ideology over
another. We believe that anyone who values the separation of powers, and who
wishes to protect Congress’s prerogatives under the Constitution, would be best
served in the first instance by making sure that no President is ever faced with
such a choice. If the political system fails, however, the President can best honor
the balances inherent in the Constitution by ignoring the debt ceiling.
But as we noted above, markets could react so badly to the prospect of
Presidential bonds as to reduce the President’s trilemma to a dilemma: unilaterally
cut spending or raise taxes.
Which of these options would be less
unconstitutional? Surprisingly, our hierarchy of choices tentatively suggests that
the President’s second-best choice would be to raise taxes.125 In addition to the
administrative advantages noted above, raising taxes rather than cutting spending
would not shortchange persons who are legally entitled to government funds.
Thus, raising taxes, like ignoring the debt ceiling, avoids a violation of Section 4
of the Fourteenth Amendment,126 whereas spending cuts, depending on their size
and apportionment, could violate Section 4 in addition to separation of powers.
It is curious that during the summer of 2011 so many commentators and
politicians considered the choice to cut spending as not merely the least bad
choice, but actually a constitutionally valid choice.127 We, by contrast, recognize
that all of the President’s choices would be unconstitutional, and we believe that
the worst choice would be for the President to seek to cut spending below the
levels authorized by Congress.
What explains this difference in perspective? Partly, we candidly admit
that our own conclusion about the relative constitutional merits of the President’s
unilaterally cutting spending versus raising taxes is substantially less certain than
our conclusion that ignoring the debt ceiling is less bad than either of the other
options. After all, the tax code is filled with deductions and credits that serve the
same economic function as spending,128 and so increases in taxes, even when
125

Note also that the President’s choices to increases taxes would be immediately
justiciable, once a person paid their higher level of tax liability and sought a refund.
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
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See Binyamin Appelbaum, Debt Ceiling Has Some Give, Until Roof Falls In, N.Y. TIMES
(May 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/business/economy/05debt.html (noting that
the Republican plan to prioritize interest payments if the debt limit is reached necessarily requires
spending cuts); Sen. Jim Demint, More Spending Is a Threat to America, POLITICO (Jan. 24, 2011,
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spending is a greater threat to the full faith and credit of the United States than increasing the debt
limit); Carl Hulse, Boehner Outlines Demands on Debt Limit Fight, N.Y. Times (May 9, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/us/politics/10boehner.html (reporting that Speaker Boehner
demands “trillions of dollars in federal spending cuts in exchange for [Republican] support of an
increase in the federal debt limit).
128

See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706–07 (1970)
(explaining that tax expenditures are similar to direct spending because they promote
governmental aims and giving examples of tax expenditures found in the tax laws).
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easier to administer than cuts in spending, may implicate the very same sorts of
policy tradeoffs. From the perspective of separation of powers, therefore, the two
could be seen as equally unconstitutional.
In addition, there is a palpable sense that unilateral increases in taxes by
the President are unthinkable in a way that unilateral spending cuts by the
President are not.129 We fully acknowledge that, as noted above, this sense that a
President just can’t do that would certainly constrain the President from raising
taxes as a matter of politics. Still, it is not clear that this political constraint is a
constitutional constraint. To be sure, longstanding practice is a factor in
constitutional interpretation, and while there is a tradition of Presidents spending
less money than Congress appropriated,130 there is no tradition of Presidents
raising taxes. But there is less to this point than meets the eye, because there is
also no tradition of Presidents spending less money than Congress appropriated,
when Congress has required that the appropriated sums be fully spent.
Thus, we would stick with our tentative conclusion that, if faced with the
dilemma of unconstitutionally raising taxes or unconstitutionally cutting
spending, the President would act less unconstitutionally by raising taxes. We
are substantially more confident in our conclusion that he would act still less
unconstitutionally by ignoring the debt ceiling, so long as the bond markets
cooperated sufficiently to convert the dilemma into a trilemma,
By now, however, readers may be wondering exactly what we mean when
we say that one course of action is more or less unconstitutional than another.
Isn’t constitutionality an on/off condition, like pregnancy? We hope that the
discussion so far shows why the answer is no. In the next Part, we build on the
foregoing analysis to develop a more general account of degrees of
unconstitutionality.
IV.
Beyond the Debt Ceiling: The General Problem of No
Constitutional Options
The prior Parts of this Article conceptualized the choice President Obama
nearly faced in the summer of 2011 as a choice among unconstitutional options.
We also offered views about how a President ought to choose among the
particular unconstitutional options of unilaterally raising taxes, unilaterally cutting
spending and unilaterally issuing debt. Readers may disagree with our ordinal
rankings. Readers may even disagree with our contention that the only realistic
options during the debt ceiling crisis were all unconstitutional. But we hope that
most readers will agree with us that the general problem warrants further
consideration. In this Part, we analyze the problem in general terms: How should
government officials choose among unconstitutional options?
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See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. See also MacManus, supra note 76, at
623 (discussing a survey of different age groups that showed “all age groups overwhelmingly
prefer spending cuts to tax increases.”).
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See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
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One might think that when faced with no constitutional options, the
President (or some other legal actor) is freed of constitutional constraint, at least
where the President (or other legal actor) has not himself created the
circumstances necessitating a fateful choice. For concreteness, suppose that
Congress had failed to raise the debt ceiling in the summer of 2011 and that
Congress alone bore responsibility for that failure. President Obama might then
have reasoned as follows: Congress has put me in the untenable position of
having to violate the Constitution, so Congress cannot now be heard to complain
if I usurp one, rather than another, of its powers. Although we have some
sympathy for such a sentiment,131 we think it is ultimately wrong, and
dangerously so.
The costs of constitutional violations will be borne by the People, not just
Congress, both in a practical sense—because people will be required to forgo
payments or pay higher taxes now or in the future—and in a constitutional
sense—because structural constitutional provisions ultimately serve the People,
not the institutions they directly protect.132 Thus, even when Congress has wholly
avoidably created a constitutional trilemma (or other multi-lemma) for the
President, he cannot use that fact as a reason to, in effect, punish the People.
Furthermore, the “all bets are off” line of reasoning has no logical
stopping point. If the necessity of violating the Constitution in some way
empowers the President to violate the Constitution in any way, then a
constitutional multi-lemma gives the President potentially unlimited power. To
stick with the debt ceiling example, he could, in violation of the constitutional
allocation of war making powers,133 unilaterally order the armed forces to invade
Venezuela or Iran, sell its oil on the world market, and use the proceeds to make
up any shortfall between appropriations and revenues from authorized taxing and
borrowing. He could, in violation of Alaska’s equal suffrage in the Senate (and
other constitutional limits),134 sell Alaska back to Russia. And so forth. We think
it clear from these and other examples that might be adduced that not all
constitutional violations are equivalent.
Once one recognizes that some constitutional violations are worse than
others, however, there arises the difficult question of developing metrics for
comparison. We do not attempt to formulate an algorithm but we do think that
some general principles can be stated, most of them implicit in our discussion of
the debt ceiling crisis in Parts II and III. After explaining why the problem is less
131
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generally should treat a political actor’s choice among unconstitutional options as presenting a
non-justiciable political question. See infra text accompanying note 201.
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rare than one might think, the balance of this Part elucidates three criteria to guide
the choice: Minimize the unconstitutional assumption of power; minimize subconstitutional harm; and preserve, to the extent possible, the ability to undo or
remedy constitutional violations.
A. The Scope of the Problem
There is virtually no legal doctrine governing the choice among
unconstitutional options.
That absence partly reflects the fact that the
Constitution’s commands are almost entirely negative, forbidding rather than
requiring certain actions. For example, government officials may not deprive
persons of life, liberty or property without due process, but they generally need
not take any affirmative steps to provide persons with various protections and
Accordingly, when faced with the temptation to act
benefits.135
unconstitutionally, government actors can usually satisfy the Constitution by
simply doing nothing.
However, government actors sometimes labor under affirmative duties.
Two such duties were at issue in the debt ceiling crisis. The Take Care Clause
imposes one duty. The President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed is best understood as an affirmative duty to execute the law.136 Thus,
although justiciability doctrines limit the ability of private parties to seek court
orders to the Administration to carry out the law,137 the duty exists nonetheless. A
President who refused to execute some law would, at a minimum, need to explain
to the public (and perhaps to members of Congress seeking to impeach him) that
the law is either unconstitutional138 or that refusal to execute the law in some set
of circumstances was a valid exercise of prosecutorial discretion.139 Simple nonenforcement would be, prima facie, a breach of constitutional duty.140
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates another affirmative duty
of the President. Suppose that some bonds or other government bills came due.
Suppose further that, under the best interpretation of Section 4, failure to pay the
bondholders and other bill submitters would call into question the public debt, and
thus violate Section 4. That conclusion is a conclusion that Section 4 imposes an
affirmative obligation.
Phrased in the passive voice (“shall not be
135

See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201-02 (1991); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t
of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989).

136

See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432,
1471 (1988).
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See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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See Presidential Auth. to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 199 (1994).

139

See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J.
2280, 2293 (2006).
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See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“Article II,
Section 3 . . . . does not permit the President to refrain from executing laws duly enacted by the
Congress as those laws are construed by the judiciary.”)
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questioned”),141 the provision’s language draws no distinction between acts that
would call the public debt into question and omissions that would do so. Indeed,
one would expect that in the usual course Section 4 would most frequently apply
to omissions (namely, failures to pay).
Nor is the President the only government actor with affirmative
obligations under the Constitution. For example, government officials have
affirmative duties to persons in their custody, such as prisoners.142
Or consider the situation of a trial judge faced with a request by a criminal
defendant to restrict press access to courtroom proceedings in some way in order
to guarantee a fair trial. Doing nothing is not in any meaningful sense an option.
To be sure, the trial judge could order that the indictment be dismissed on the
ground that there is no way to fully honor both the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights and the First Amendment rights of the press. In a sense, that would be
doing nothing. But we think—and as we explain below, the courts think—that
this is too high a price to pay to avoid choosing the lesser constitutional evil.
In light of the fact that government actors will, from time to time, need to
choose among unconstitutional options, how should they make that choice? We
next elaborate three salient principles.
B) Minimize the Unconstitutional Assumption of Power
In our discussion of the practical dimensions of the various horns of the
trilemma in Part III, we noted how a Presidential decision to ignore the debt
ceiling would require a smaller exercise of distinctively policy judgment than
would be required by a decision to cut spending or raise taxes. That factor
matters for the comparative constitutional analysis because of the nature of the
underlying violations. Any Presidential decision to tax, borrow, or spend (or not
spend) without congressional authorization violates the principle of separation of
powers because the powers to tax, to borrow and to spend (or not spend) are all
allocated to Congress, not the President.143 But in so allocating power, the
Constitution also allocates to Congress the power to make the innumerable policy
tradeoffs and compromises that go into a budget.144 Indeed, one could readily say
that the Constitution allocates to the most representative branch of the federal
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See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04
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ed. 2010); JAMES J. GOSLING, ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 64 (2008)
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government the powers to tax, borrow and spend precisely because the exercise of
these powers involves inherently political choices.
One might plausibly disagree with our conclusion that the President
assumes more legislative policy power when he unilaterally cuts spending than
when he unilaterally raises taxes. One could even disagree with our conclusion
that the President assumes more legislative policy power when he unilaterally cuts
spending or raises taxes than when he unilaterally issues Presidential bonds. But
we hope that no one will disagree with our underlying view that, other things
being equal, as between two ways of unilaterally exercising legislative power in
violation of the Constitution, the President should choose the course in which he
unconstitutionally exercises less legislative power.
In choosing whether to usurp the legislative power to borrow, tax, or (not)
spend, the President apparently faces a choice among roughly commensurable
constitutional violations. Each power is allocated to Congress, and so the
President compares apples to apples in choosing whether the constitutional
balance of power will be more or less upset by his unilateral exercise of one rather
than another power.
Yet the actions in question are not exactly commensurate: One might think
that taxing is somehow more quintessentially a legislative power than borrowing
or spending,145 in which case one might conclude (contrary to our own tentative
conclusion in Part III), that the constitutionally worst option would be for the
President to unilaterally raise taxes. Further, depending on which unilateral
course the President chooses, he might violate constitutional provisions beyond
separation of powers.146 As we discussed in Part III, a Presidential decision
unilaterally cutting spending would potentially violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as separation of powers. Meanwhile, a Presidential decision
to unilaterally raise taxes could be said to violate the provision of Article I
requiring that bills raising revenue must originate in the House of
Representatives.147 There is no agreed-upon metric for aggregating and weighing
these respective constitutional violations. Indeed, so far as we are aware, there
does not even appear to be any awareness of the potential problem.
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The relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment to the analysis highlights an
important, more general, problem: Some circumstances might require a President
or other legal actor to trade off structural constitutional violations, such as
separation of powers, against rights provisions, such as Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. And if you think that Section 4 is not a rights provision,
consider a hypothetical variation on the debt ceiling crisis that clearly does
involve a rights provision.
Suppose that Congress purported to “solve” the debt ceiling impasse by
raising the debt ceiling by an amount insufficient to cover the existing shortfall,
but that, in violation of the Takings Clause148 and (maybe) the Bill of Attainder
Clause,149 Congress made up the difference by including in the same bill a
measure confiscating the holdings of a small number of extremely wealthy
individuals named in the bill. Could the President sign the bill on the theory that
violating the Takings Clause and (maybe) the Bill of Attainder Clause would be
no worse than usurping legislative power, as he would have to do under the
trilemma if he vetoed the legislation? Or, conversely, is it categorically worse to
violate two constitutional provisions or doctrines—the Takings Clause and the
Bill of Attainder Clause—than to violate just one—the separation-of-powers
doctrine? Would the confiscation plan be constitutionally equivalent to unilateral
Presidential action cutting spending because each action involves two distinct
constitutional violations?
We would reject the notion that the key question is the number of
constitutional provisions at stake. Perhaps if other things were equal, then one
could say that it is worse to violate n+1 constitutional provisions than to violate n
constitutional provisions. But more broadly, we think it fairly clear that any
measure of comparative constitutional harm should be qualitative, not
quantitative—or at least not merely quantitative.
Consider an admittedly fanciful example. Suppose a criminal madman
slips undetected into the Oval Office and, holding a loaded gun to the head of the
President, orders him either: (1) to instruct FBI agents to perform a warrantless
search of the home of the criminal’s ex-wife, and charge her with possession of
obscenity when they find a copy of Lady Chatterley’s Lover; or (2) to unilaterally
declare war on Iran and order a nuclear strike against Tehran. Assuming the
President is unwilling to take a bullet for the Constitution (as the consequence of a
refusal to make a choice),150 we think it fairly clear that the President should
choose option (1). Option (1) is not only less harmful than option (2), but also
less unconstitutional, even though option (1) involves violating two constitutional
provisions (the Fourth and First Amendments), whereas option (2) only involves
violating one (the allocation to Congress of the power to declare war).151
148
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In the next sub-Part, we shall have more to say about whether the President or other
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simply refuse to choose should imagine a variant on the hypothetical example in which the
madman informs the President that if the President refuses to choose either option, the madman—
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What we take to be shared intuitions about the foregoing example also
undercut any suggestion that rights are trumps152 in the sense that one should
always prefer violating some non-rights provision to violating a rights provision.
Rights may be trumps in the sense that they prevail against most utilitarian
goals,153 but they are not trumps in the sense that they always prevail against other
(non-rights) constitutional provisions. Indeed, constitutional doctrine allows that
rights can generally be overridden by a law that is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest,154 whereas most non-rights provisions do not appear to
permit such overrides. For example, the legislative veto is not permitted even if it
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest,155 whereas a law that abridges
freedom of speech or uses a suspect classification would be valid if it had those
characteristics.156
That difference suggests that perhaps the opposite presumption should
apply. In other words, perhaps non-derogable constitutional provisions (like the
Article I, Section 7 requirements at issue in the line-item veto case) should
generally prevail over derogable ones (like the rights to free speech and to equal
protection). We think that there may be a limited sense in which such a
presumption in fact makes sense: Complying with separation of powers,
federalism or other non-derogable constitutional limits could, in principle, be the
sort of compelling interest that justifies use of a race-based classification or a
content-based regulation of speech.157

who is, among his other talents, an excellent mimic—will impersonate the President and order
both the violation of the rights of the madman’s ex-wife and the nuclear strike on Tehran. Thus,
in this modified example, failure to choose itself leads to unconstitutional actions.
151

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.

152

See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi-xv & 367 (1977).

153

See RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 370 (1985).

154

For this reason, Professor Schauer has aptly stated that rights are better understood as shields
rather than trumps. See Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV.
415, 429-30 (1993).
155

See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).

156

See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-26 (2000).

157

Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2677, 2681 (2009) (stating that
compliance with Title VII could be a compelling interest justifying presumptively impermissible
race-conscious public employment measures).

Page 40 of 55

Lessons of the Debt Ceiling Standoff

But one must be careful not to run too far with this line of analysis.
Although saving the President’s life certainly counts as a compelling interest, we
do not think it would be accurate to say that it is therefore constitutionally
permissible for the President to order the FBI to charge the gun-wielding
madman’s ex-wife with obscenity for possessing non-obscene materials. First
Amendment doctrine is not derogable on this particular: It does not utilize the
compelling interest test to determine what qualifies as obscenity.158 Likewise,
neither is doctrine under the Fourth Amendment, the other rights provision in our
hypothetical case, exactly derogable. To be sure, there are exceptions to the
warrant requirement, and some of them—such as the exigent circumstances
exception159—are based on compelling interests, but the doctrine does not directly
ask in particular cases whether to sacrifice the right for the sake of a compelling
interest.160 So the possibility of using existing doctrine under a constitutional
right to accommodate a structural constitutional provision will not always be
available.
Moreover, even when a right can be overridden by a compelling interest,
the doctrine assumes that overriding the right is necessary to achieve that
compelling interest in some non-fortuitous way.161 Yet the gun to the head of the
President bears the wrong sort of causal relationship to any benefit that would
derive from charging the madman’s ex-wife with obscenity for such a charge to
qualify as narrowly tailored to advancing a compelling interest. We think that in
our hypothetical example it is more straightforward and more accurate to say that
the madman creates a choice for the President between unconstitutional options.
To characterize one option as valid in virtue of the fact that it enables the
President to avoid the other option is to omit the key step in the process: deciding
which option is worse. We shall return to this characterization issue in Sub-Part
(C) below.
For now, we want to note the seemingly irreducible mushiness of any
plausible test for degrees of unconstitutionality. It is easier to state what the test
should not be than what it should be. As noted above, the test should not simply
count the number of constitutional violations. Nor do we think that there can be
any all-purpose hierarchy of constitutional provisions. To use an example to
which we shall return below, it may be tempting to say that the First Amendment
is more important than the Sixth Amendment or vice-versa, but nothing in the
constitutional text or our history provides a basis for either judgment.162 And one
can imagine circumstances in which the values underlying one provision prevail
over those underlying the other, as well as vice-versa.
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To make that last point concrete, suppose that the gun-wielding madman
has different priorities. Suppose that he offers the President the following choice:
(1) Send the FBI to the home of a potential whistleblower with instructions to
seize and destroy documents exposing high-level government corruption;163 or (2)
approve, and then act upon, a State Department legal memorandum asserting that
American support for Libyan rebels in their resistance against the Gadaffi regime
can continue without notification to Congress under the War Powers Act.164 Even
assuming that the President believes that course (2) would usurp the wardeclaring power of Congress, he could nonetheless fairly conclude that course (2)
is less unconstitutional than course (1) because the abuse of power entailed by (1)
makes the violation of the Fourth and First Amendments worse in this case.
Comparing this conclusion with the conclusion we reached with respect to the
first set of choices discussed above in the original gun-wielding madman scenario,
we see that the question whether one unconstitutional course is more or less
unconstitutional than another can yield different answers in different
circumstances, even when the exact same constitutional provisions are in play.
Does that mean that the entire enterprise of comparing unconstitutional
courses of action is utterly mysterious? Not necessarily. To say that one cannot
devise an all-purpose formula for weighing constitutional harms against one
another is not to say that the enterprise is hopelessly subjective. We think that the
sorts of factors that might be invoked in particular circumstances will often garner
consensus. Indeed, we are familiar with courts and political actors making the
relevant sorts of judgments, even if we are unaccustomed to thinking of them in
the terms described in this Article.
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Consider the choice courts must make in deciding whether to adopt a
proposed narrowing construction of a statute in order to avoid a difficult
constitutional question. On the one hand, courts try to construe statutes so that
they are constitutional, because invalidating a statute is a serious affront to the
democratic will as expressed through the legislature.165 On the other hand, courts
will not wholly re-write statutes in order to avoid a difficult constitutional
question, because such re-writing is a different sort of affront to the democratic
will, insofar as it usurps the legislative function.166 Which affront is worse? The
cases do not give a categorical answer, instead applying context-specific
judgment to allow creative interpretation but not re-writing. While there is no
sharp boundary line between those activities, there can be consensus about a great
many cases that fall on one or the other side of the boundary.
We think the same should be true about choices among unconstitutional
options. In our discussion of the debt-ceiling crisis in Part III, we gave contextspecific reasons why a Presidential decision simply to ignore the debt ceiling
would require the exercise of substantially less legislative-style policy judgment
than the decision of what programs to cut and by how much or the decision of
what taxes to raise and by how much. That judgment reasonably closely parallels
the sort of judgment courts must make in deciding whether a statute can fairly
bear a proposed narrowing construction. Indeed, if anything, the argument that
ignoring the debt ceiling usurps less legislative power than either cutting spending
or raising taxes strikes us as more decisive than common arguments for adopting
or rejecting a narrowing construction of a statute challenged as unconstitutional.
More broadly, here, as elsewhere, an admittedly mushy multi-factor test can still
yield clear answers in cases far from the margins.
C) Minimize Sub-Constitutional Harm
Another lesson that emerges from the debt-ceiling crisis is that decision
makers ought to try to minimize sub-constitutional harm as well as constitutional
harm. Here, “sub-constitutional” harm refers to real harm—economic hardship or
even lost lives—but not necessarily harm that amounts to a constitutional
violation. The difference between the two madman scenarios sheds light on what
we mean. In both instances, option 2 involved the unconstitutional usurpation by
the President of the power of Congress to commit the nation to war. But part of
what made option 2 worse in the first scenario than in the second scenario was a
judgment about consequences: It would be worse to use nuclear weapons against
Iran than to provide air support for Libyan rebels because the consequences of
using nuclear weapons against Iran—the deaths of millions of Iranian civilians
and the possibility of nuclear retaliation against the United States or its allies—
would be so much worse than the consequences of supporting Libyan rebels—at
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best displacing a dictator with democracy and at worst a mostly-contained civil
war.
But in saying that differences between the consequences of
unconstitutional options matter, we do not mean to say that consequences are all
that matters. A President’s decision to ignore the debt ceiling, we have
emphasized, would usurp less legislative power—and would thus be less
unconstitutional—than a President’s decision to decide which spending programs
to cut and by how much or which taxes to raise and by how much. Ignoring the
debt ceiling would continue to be less unconstitutional than either of the other
unilateral Presidential actions even if it appeared that, on balance, one of these
other options would lead to somewhat better consequences. Perhaps the damage
to the economy from the government having to pay higher rates of interest on
Presidential bonds could be expected to be greater than the damage to the
economy from the expected loss of confidence that would arise from unilateral
Presidential action cutting spending or raising taxes. Even so, we think that
ignoring the debt ceiling would be the less unconstitutional option—unless the
differences in projected consequences were reckoned in orders of magnitude. Put
differently, taking the Constitution seriously—and rejecting the “all bets are off”
approach—means giving priority to minimizing constitutional harm, while
treating as secondary the principle that sub-constitutional harm ought to be
minimized.
To be sure, giving priority to the avoidance of constitutional harm does
not mean giving it absolute priority. If the consequences of following what would
otherwise be the least unconstitutional of several unconstitutional paths would be
truly catastrophic, then we think that government officials would be justified in
choosing an otherwise somewhat more unconstitutional option that did not lead to
catastrophe. With this caveat, our view is analogous to what moral philosophers
call threshold deontology: one treats certain rules as impervious to arguments for
being overridden by consequentialist considerations, unless the expected adverse
consequences rise above a threshold of moral catastrophe.167 For example, a
threshold deontologist might say that torture is morally impermissible to save a
life or even ten lives but that it is permissible to save a million lives.168 Likewise
here, a President should not choose to cut spending or raise taxes rather than
ignore the debt ceiling in order to save a few million dollars in GDP, but he could
make that choice to avert a substantial chance of a worldwide depression.
The principle of catastrophe-avoidance also applies—or at least, we would
argue, should apply—even in circumstances in which the President or some other
political actor has available at least one technically constitutional option. For
parallelism we shall call our view of this question threshold constitutionality. Just
as threshold deontologists are deontologists below a threshold of catastrophic
harm, threshold constitutionalists favor compliance with the Constitution below a
threshold of catastrophic harm.
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See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISRAEL L. REV. 280 (1989);
Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 (2000).
168

See Alexander, supra note 167, at 898-901. Compare Moore, supra note 167, at 314-15.

Page 44 of 55

Lessons of the Debt Ceiling Standoff

We can illustrate threshold constitutionality by reference to Professor
Balkin’s “jumbo coins” proposal. Recall that Balkin argued that, even if
Congress had failed to raise the debt ceiling, the President could have avoided
acting unconstitutionally if he had instructed the Treasury Department to mint two
one-trillion-dollar platinum coins to be deposited in the government account with
the Federal Reserve, thereby creating an additional two-trillion dollars for the
government to spend on its obligations.169
We note two objections to the jumbo coins proposal. First, the very act of
minting trillion-dollar coins looks so cartoonish and desperate that it could
undermine faith in the government’s ability to repay its obligations, and for that
reason might be understood as a violation of Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.170 A public that observes the federal government resorting to exotic
gimmicks like minting trillion-dollar coins has reason to worry that public debt
may go unpaid. Second, even if one takes a narrower view of Section 4—so that
nothing short of actual default on obligations counts as a violation—the jumbo
coins proposal would likely spook the markets, leading lenders to demand a very
high rate of interest.
But is that second factor a legitimate consideration absent constitutional
necessity? Suppose that the jumbo coins would not actually violate Section 4 of
the Fourteenth Amendment or any other constitutional provision. Even if minting
the jumbo coins would have terrible consequences, would the President
nonetheless be obligated to prefer the jumbo coin option to one of the
unconstitutional options (such as ignoring the debt ceiling, cutting spending or
raising taxes)? Is there some requirement that a President (or other government
official) must exhaust his or her constitutional options, no matter how disastrous,
before he or she may even consider unconstitutional options? More generally, is
threshold constitutionality justified? We think it is, although we also think that
most of our analysis should be relevant to those who disagree.
Disagreement with threshold constitutionality would lead to an absolutist
position. No matter how high the cost of compliance, the absolutist says that
government officials simply may not violate the Constitution if they have any
constitutional options. In this view, a non-defeasible constitutional provision or
doctrine—like the separation of powers—is just that: completely nondefeasible.171
For the absolutist, choices among truly unconstitutional options will rarely
arise, because any constitutional option—no matter how outlandish or tragic—
will have to be given priority. Under this view, the President must sacrifice his
life to the gun-wielding madman rather than choose one of the two
unconstitutional options; he must also choose the jumbo coins option (or some
equally outlandish but constitutionally valid scheme) if he concludes that it is
constitutional, even if doing so would bring financial ruin that could have been
avoided by one of the other unconstitutional options.
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We think that the absolutist position for rejecting threshold
constitutionality is unjustified for the same sorts of reasons that have been
advanced in favor of threshold deontology. Where a deontological purist would
avoid telling a lie even at the cost of ending the world, we would not. President
Lincoln most clearly expressed the constitutional equivalent of threshold
deontology in explaining (through a rhetorical question) his willingness to
temporarily sacrifice Congressional authority over suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus172 while the Union’s survival hung in the balance: “Are all the
laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that
one be violated?”173 Averting catastrophe, in Lincoln’s view and ours, warrants
violating the Constitution.
That is not to deny that there is something to be said for the absolutist
view. One might worry that if constitutional provisions are not deemed
inviolable, government officials will attach too little weight to them. The
absolutist stance is sub-optimal, in this approach, but less sub-optimal than any
approach that rejects absolute prohibitions. To continue the torture analogy, if the
law purports to permit torture but only in the ticking-bomb scenario, one might
worry that the government will start hearing bombs ticking everywhere.174 An
absolute rule deliberately overshoots the mark to avoid the worse sin of
undershooting the mark.175
Notwithstanding the foregoing logic, one might conclude—as we do in the
present context—that there are both principled and pragmatic problems with a
deliberately over-inclusive absolute prohibition. If one thinks that catastrophes
ought to be averted, then, as a matter of principle, there is something dishonest
about pretending that one takes an absolutist stance. Moreover, as a practical
matter, it is hardly clear that the absolutist prohibition does not lead to overdeterrence. By hypothesis, threshold constitutionality only permits resort to
unconstitutional action to avert a catastrophe, and so adopting the absolutist
position risks bringing about catastrophes. At a minimum, before adopting the
absolutist position, one ought to consider the alternatives.
One alternative would be a version of threshold constitutionality that
incorporates catastrophe avoidance into considerations of constitutionality. In this
approach, catastrophe avoidance operates within constitutional law to treat an
otherwise unconstitutional course of action as constitutional so long as it is the
least unconstitutional of the possible courses of action that avoid catastrophic
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harm.176 In the context of the debt ceiling crisis one might say something like
this: We all thought that the separation of powers was non-defeasible but we have
now encountered a case that leads us to conclude otherwise. Thus, the rule that
says that the President may not borrow money (or tax or cut spending) without
congressional authorization should be reformulated to say that the President may
not borrow money (or tax or cut spending) without congressional authorization,
unless doing so is necessary to avert a catastrophe.
Call this the
accommodationist version of threshold constitutionality: In this approach, the
Constitution accommodates the need to avoid catastrophes by authorizing what
might otherwise be constitutional violations. 177 Slogans like “the Constitution is
not a suicide pact” reflect accommodationist sentiment.178
Accommodationism has deep roots in our constitutional culture and those
roots generally prevent courts and other political actors from even recognizing
that constitutional duties may conflict. Consider Nebraska Press Ass’n v.
Stuart,179 which involved at least the potential for a conflict between the First
Amendment right of the press to report fully on a criminal trial and the Sixth
Amendment right of the defendant to a fair trial untainted by pre-trial publicity.
Speaking for the Court in that case, Chief Justice Burger began by appearing to
recognize a textual conflict. He wrote: “The authors of the Bill of Rights did not
undertake to assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment
rights, ranking one as superior to the other.”180 He then disavowed any judicial
power to “assign[]to one [right] priority over the other.”181 And yet, the Court
resolved the case.
How? By construing the outer bounds of the First and Sixth Amendments
so that neither infringed the other. The Court held that the First Amendment right
to freedom of speech and of the press can be overridden with gag orders where
doing so is essential to ensuring a fair trial182—thus favoring the Sixth
Amendment over the First Amendment if push comes to shove—but the Court
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also held that in the particular case there had not been a sufficient showing that
muzzling the press was necessary to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.183
Although we sagree with the substantive result of Nebraska Press Ass’n,
we regard the Court’s claim to have avoided prioritizing rights as highly
formalistic. The Court said, in substance if not in form, that the fair trial right is
more important than the free press right, at least in a case of unavoidable conflict.
But the Court somehow managed to persuade itself that conflict was avoidable.
What were the alternatives? An absolutist of the sort who would insist on
the Treasury minting jumbo coins at the cost of crashing the global economy
might say that the conflict in Nebraska Press Ass’n was avoidable. The defendant
in that case was accused of murdering six people, but the Constitution does not
require that every murderer be punished. If it was impossible for the defendant to
receive a fair trial and to honor the freedom of the press, an absolutist would say
that the constitutionally required solution is to simply dismiss the indictment.
The dismissal solution might take as its model the exclusionary rule in
criminal procedure, which bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.184 If there is insufficient other evidence for a
jury to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then the exclusionary
rule effectively requires dismissal of an indictment.185 If that rule obtains for the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the absolutist might ask, why not for the First and
Sixth Amendments?
The comparison is suggestive but, we think, ultimately unpersuasive, as
the Supreme Court’s own exclusionary rule jurisprudence indicates. In the postWarren Court era, the case law has substantially whittled away at the exclusionary
rule, recognizing numerous exceptions where the Justices find that application of
the rule is not cost-justified.186 We think that these exceptions show that the
exclusionary rule has not been understood in absolutist terms. Although early
cases invoking a judicial integrity rationale for the exclusionary rule could be
understood in absolutist terms, the modern doctrine—which rationalizes the
exclusionary rule as a deterrent to illegal police investigation187—shows the Court
carefully calculating costs and benefits. Put simply, we do not have a criminal
procedure doctrine that instructs courts to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence
183
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even when the results would be catastrophic. We have more nearly the opposite:
a set of doctrines that seek to limit the damage from strict insistence on the
observance of constitutional rights.
Indeed, even those jurists who have resisted the erosion of the
exclusionary rule need not be understood as constitutional absolutists. Rather, it
may make more sense to understand their view as one that simply strikes a
different balance from the balance that their tougher-on-crime colleagues strike.188
For the would-be strict enforcers of the exclusionary rule, the long-term damage
that comes from admitting unlawfully obtained evidence may seem greater than
the harm that comes from occasionally permitting a guilty defendant to go free.189
If a weighing of costs and benefits underlies the Justices’ avoidance of
absolutism by commonly rejecting the application of the exclusionary rule as a
remedy for acknowledged constitutional violations, no such open weighing is
visible in their efforts to deal with circumstances in which two rights conflict.
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the options on offer in Nebraska Press Ass’n
was typical for American jurisprudence in its failure to engage in open balancing,
and in that respect the United States is an outlier. In most other constitutional
democracies, a court (or other constitutional interpreter) would view a conflict
between two rights (or any two constitutional provisions) as calling for
balancing.190 A court (or other actor) would ask, which right should prevail in the
particular circumstances? The following figure illustrates the difference between
accommodation of the Nebraska Press Ass’n sort and European or Canadian style
balancing.
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In the accommodation approach, the prevailing right (here the Sixth
Amendment fair trial right) eats into area that the other right (here the First
Amendment free press right) would otherwise occupy. By contrast, in the
balancing approach, the constitutional decision maker recognizes that the two
rights overlap (as represented by the shaded area), but then decides that one rather
than the other right prevails in that area of overlap. The results may often be the
same. Even the processes of reaching those results may be tacitly similar. But
the balancing approach has the comparative virtue of transparency: Courts (and
other actors) openly admit both that there is a conflict between the constitutional
provisions and that they are favoring one rather than the other approach.
We think that the choice between accommodation and balancing will often
be a matter of labels, although perhaps not always. As a formal matter, American
constitutional law resists balancing and tends to be more libertarian than the
constitutional and human rights law of other jurisdictions,191 but the United States
is a more libertarian (and less egalitarian) country than nearly all other
constitutional democracies in other respects as well.192 Accordingly, it is hardly
clear that U.S. constitutional law is libertarian because it eschews balancing rather
191
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than vice-versa. In any event, our interest in the choice between accommodation
and open balancing has little to do with the choice between libertarianism and
egalitarianism.
Even under most balancing approaches, courts typically say that after the
balancing is completed, the course of action that vindicates the winning right (or
other provision) is constitutionally permissible (or, in the case of a multinational
human rights treaty such as the European Convention on Human Rights,
permitted by the treaty).193 In that sense, rights balancing is not a perfect model
for the choice we seek to understand here, because we are interested in how to
decide among unconstitutional options. Nonetheless, balancing as performed by
courts and other actors in other constitutional democracies is still a better model
for the choice among unconstitutional options than is accommodation because in
balancing, unlike in accommodation, the element of choice is apparent.
By contrast with accommodationist approaches that suppress or deny the
existence of conflict among constitutional values, balancing approaches more
clearly acknowledge what Michael Walzer has termed the problem of “dirty
hands.”194 The core idea is that political actors and others sometimes face “tragic
choices” in which any choice they make (including the choice to do nothing) will
be a choice to do evil. (The William Styron novel Sophie’s Choice—in which
Nazis force a woman to choose which of her two children to sacrifice in order that
the other may be spared195—presents a dramatic example in the personal realm.)
They have reason to choose the least bad option but doing so remains wrongful.
In the legal academic literature, Oren Gross has built on the insights of Walzer
and others to develop a set of principles for the legal system to evaluate extraconstitutional decision-making.196
We take no position here on the exact approach proposed by Walzer,
Gross or anyone else. Our point in invoking their work is much more basic:
Whether we like it or not, life sometimes presents tragic choices in which there
are no good options; and likewise with the law. In the latter circumstances,
insistence on compliance with constitutional rules will be futile (if there are truly
no permissible options), catastrophic (if there are technically permissible options
that will lead to a catastrophe but one insists on absolute adherence to such rules
anyway) or question begging (if one uses an accommodationist strategy to
suppress the conflict).
Summarizing the principles that have emerged in this sub-Part, we would
emphasize three points: (1) After giving priority to minimizing constitutional
harm, legal actors finding themselves with no constitutional options should
attempt to minimize sub-constitutional harm; but (2) minimizing constitutional
harm should not be given absolute priority, so that where sub-constitutional harm
193
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exceeds a catastrophic threshold, legal actors may sometimes even be justified in
choosing an unconstitutional course over a constitutional one; and (3) in choosing
among unconstitutional options, it is better to acknowledge conflict than to recategorize constitutional violations in ways that suppress or disguise conflict.
D) Preserve, to the Extent Possible, the Ability to Undo or Remedy
Constitutional Violations
Our final general principle states that government officials choosing
among unconstitutional options should preserve, to the extent possible, their own
ability and the ability of other actors, to undo or remedy constitutional violations.
Often the choice among unconstitutional options will be controversial. Indeed,
sometimes it will not even be clear that one or another proposed course of action
really is unconstitutional. Accordingly, it should weigh in favor of some
proposed choice that it is readily reversible.
To the extent that a choice among putatively unconstitutional options is
controversial because of a contest over constitutional meaning, political actors
ought to strive to ensure that their choice permits expeditious judicial review.
This factor arguably cuts against our own prioritization in the debt ceiling
trilemma. Recall that by our lights, the President’s two worst unconstitutional
options were unilaterally cutting spending and unilaterally raising taxes, while his
least bad unconstitutional option was to issue Presidential bonds. Yet cutting
spending or raising taxes would likely lead to justiciable cases, whereas issuing
Presidential bonds might not.
A decision to cut spending would quickly lead to a lawsuit by a person or
entity legally entitled to receive funding absent the cut.197 Likewise, a decision to
raise taxes would likely lead to a lawsuit by some party whose resulting tax
liability increased. To be sure, given the Anti-Injunction Act,198 a taxpayer could
not seek to enjoin the assessment or collection of his increased taxes, but once he
paid the tax, he could sue for a refund in the Tax Court, with review in the Article
III courts, including the potential for certiorari review by the Supreme Court, to
follow. But a lawsuit challenging the President’s decision to issue Presidential
bonds would not necessarily lead to litigation.
Would anyone suffer the sort of concrete and particularized injury needed
to authorize Article III standing as a consequence of the issuance of Presidential
bonds? If the government were to fail to pay interest or principal to the holder of
a Presidential bond, then the bondholder would clearly suffer injury. But what if
the government does not default? Perhaps holders of non-Presidential bonds
might worry that by increasing the total debt, Presidential bonds make it less
likely that they will receive payment—much in the way that the holder of a first
mortgage on a home might worry that the homeowner’s further indebtedness to
new lenders puts the initial loan at greater risk. Yet as we explained above, the
197
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principles of default risk applicable to private parties do not apply to a sovereign
lending in its own currency.199 Moreover, the whole point of the Presidential
bonds would be to prevent default on existing obligations, and so it seems highly
speculative to say that the Presidential bonds increase default risk. In any event,
even if the Presidential bonds did increase default risk somewhat, the increased
risk of a default in the indefinite future does not count as the sort of “imminent”
injury that the Court’s cases require for Article III standing.200 Thus, it appears
that a decision to issue Presidential bonds would be substantially more difficult to
challenge in court than a Presidential decision to cut spending or raise taxes.
Does that fact lead us to reassess our priority among the elements of the
trilemma? In a word, no. It is true that judicial reviewability counts for
something, but here the reason why there would be no judicial review of the
Presidential bonds is a double-edged sword that is much sharper on its other edge.
No one has standing to challenge the Presidential bonds because no one is injured
by them. In the overall cost-benefit analysis, surely the fact that Presidential
bonds cause no concrete and imminent harm counts mostly in their favor, not
against them. We do not claim that Presidential bonds are necessarily harmless.
Relative to spending cuts and tax increases, Presidential bonds increase the
national debt, which could have adverse long-term consequences. But spending
cuts and tax increases also could have adverse long-term consequences and, in
addition, they cause immediate injuries in a way that the Presidential bonds do
not. How one nets out the various short-term and long-term costs and benefits of
each possible course of action is a very complicated question. Our point for now
is simply that the absence of any concrete and imminent harm to an identifiable
party probably counts in favor of Presidential bonds by an amount that may well
outweigh the cost in forgone judicial review.
In any event, judicial review is no panacea. A court could decide a multilemma case in a way that makes clear that one course of action is preferred. For
example, a court might decide that the President has the power to cut spending
after all. But assuming a case in which there truly are no (non-catastrophic)
constitutional options, a reviewing court does not face the same decision that a
political actor does.
For concreteness, suppose that faced with the trilemma, the President
chooses to cut spending and that a canceled beneficiary challenges the cuts. A
reviewing court cannot simply rule that the spending cut was unconstitutional
because, by hypothesis, anything the President might have done would have been
unconstitutional. But as we have unpacked the President’s trilemma, selecting a
course of action requires a delicate blend of constitutional and policy analysis.
We can well imagine that the best course for a President in resolving the trilemma
would be to issue Presidential bonds but that the courts ought to uphold the
President’s selection of any of the horns of the trilemma as a reasonable exercise
of his discretion. We can even sympathize with a holding that a complaint
charging the President (or other political actor) with choosing the wrong
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unconstitutional option ought to be non-justiciable. In this view, the President
does not face a naked policy choice in choosing among unconstitutional options
but the relevant constitutional and policy guideposts leave him with sufficient
discretion to render the matter a political question.
Whether or not a particular choice among unconstitutional options would
lead to a justiciable case or controversy, political actors ought to try to take
actions that can be undone by other political actors. That is especially true
where—as in the debt ceiling trilemma—the core concern is separation of
powers.201 Because the President, no matter what he does, will end up stepping
on the toes of Congress, he ought to ensure that Congress can specify which toes
it wants stepped on (or conversely, which toes it most wants to avoid being
stepped on).
We argued in Part III that the prior choices of Congress indicate that it
placed a higher priority on having its decisions about taxing and spending
respected than about having the borrowing limit respected. That conclusion was
substantially based on the detailed political tradeoffs that go into taxing and
spending laws, by contrast with the simple selection of a number for the debt
ceiling.202 The same factors lead us to conclude that a Presidential decision to
spend or tax unilaterally would be more disruptive of the legal status quo than a
decision to issue Presidential bonds, and thus substantially more difficult for
Congress to undo. That is because the departure from Congress’s choices could
create a dramatically different political status quo, thus calling into play a new set
of political forces. If some members of Congress do not like the choices the
President makes in canceling spending or raising taxes, the new political reality
may prevent them from restoring the prior status quo, even though Congress
never voted for the particular set of compromises entailed by the President’s
unilateral action.203 Just as legislation can be “sticky,”204 so can acts taken by the
President that usurp legislative power.
Put most simply, because a Presidential decision to cut spending or raise
taxes unilaterally usurps substantially more legislative power than a decision to
issue Presidential bonds, cutting spending or raising taxes will generally be
stickier. If judicial review of a Presidential decision to cut spending or raise taxes
is more likely to occur than judicial review of the decision to issue Presidential
bonds, effective Congressional review of the Presidential bonds is more likely
than effective Congressional review of unilateral spending cuts or tax increases.
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And where, as in the debt crisis case, the core concern is separation of powers,
preserving the opportunity for effective Congressional review strikes us as more
important than facilitating judicial review.
V. Conclusion
The debt ceiling crisis of August, 2011 nearly presented President Obama
with a trilemma of unconstitutional options. Should he or a future President ever
squarely face such a trilemma, he would have no good choices and certainly no
good constitutional choices. But choose the President must. He should do so in a
manner that minimizes the unconstitutional assumption of power, minimizes subconstitutional harm, and maximally preserves the ability of other actors to undo or
remedy constitutional violations. In the debt ceiling context, given the balance of
constitutional, practical, and prudential considerations, the least unconstitutional
choice would be for the President to continue to issue debt, in the amounts
authorized by the duly-enacted budget of the United States.
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